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CORRECTIONS FOR RACIAL DISPARITIES IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT
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ABSTRACT
Much empirical analysis has documented racial disparities at the
beginning and end stages of criminal cases. However, our under-
standing about the perpetuation of—and even corrections
for—differential outcomes in the process remains less than complete.
This Article provides a comprehensive examination of criminal
dispositions using all DWI cases in North Carolina from 2001 to
2011, focusing on several major decision points in the process.
Starting with pretrial hearings and culminating in sentencing
results, we track differences in outcomes by race and gender. Before
sentencing, significant gaps emerge in the severity of pretrial release
conditions that disadvantage black and Hispanic defendants. Yet
when prosecutors decide whether to pursue charges, we observe an
initial correction mechanism: Hispanic men are almost two-thirds
more likely to have those charges dropped relative to white men.
Although few cases survive after the plea bargaining stage, a sec-
ond correction mechanism arises: Hispanic men are substantially
less likely to receive harsher sentences and are sent to jail for
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significantly less time relative to white men. The first mechanism is
based, in part, on prosecutors’ reviewing the strength of the evidence,
but much more on declining to invest scarce resources in the pursuit
of defendants who fail to appear for trial. The second mechanism
seems to follow more directly from judicial discretion to reverse
decisions made by law enforcement or prosecutors. We discuss
possible explanations for these novel empirical results and review
methods for more precisely identifying causal mechanisms in
criminal justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Although recognized for years, widespread concern over racial,
ethnic, and income-based disparities persists in the criminal justice
system.1 These differentials arise at various stages of case process-
ing, starting with the probability of being stopped and searched by
law enforcement, and culminating in penalties assessed after
conviction, irrespective of any prior plea agreement.2 These bookend
events have received ample attention in the literature.3 But
intermediate decision points—the terms of bail at arraignment,
whether the prosecutor declines to charge an arrestee, the quality
of legal representation, and plea agreements—are not well under-
stood.4 Moreover, the predominant analytical framework compares
outcomes for black defendants relative only to their white counter-
parts with little to no discussion of the rapidly growing Hispanic
population.5
1. See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Joan Petersilia, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System:
A Summary, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 15, 16 fig.1 (1985) (showing large differences between the
racial composition of the United States and prison populations from the 1980s); Ruth D.
Peterson, The Central Place of Race in Crime and Justice—The American Society of
Criminology’s 2011 Sutherland Address, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 303, 306-07 (2012) (documenting
a range of statistical patterns in which racial minorities fare much worse in the criminal
justice system); Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 341-56 (1997)
(reviewing “general patterns and trends” regarding “racial differences in criminal justice
processing”).
2. Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 1, at 343-44, 346-49.
3. See, e.g., Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice
in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 127, 145-47 (2006)
(analyzing police searches of motor vehicles); John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 203-09 (2001) (same); Jeffery
T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Variation in Trial Penalties Among Serious Violent Offenses,
44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 631-32, 655-56 (2006) (studying sentencing patterns after jury
convictions); John Wooldredge et al., Victim-Based Effects on Racially Disparate Sentencing
in Ohio, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 86 (2011) (same).
4. To our knowledge, the only study that systematically examines intermediate decision
points and expands demographic variables to include Hispanic arrestees is Traci Schlesinger,
The Cumulative Effects of Racial Disparities in Criminal Processing, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L
STUD. 261, 263-64 (2007). Schlesinger’s multi-jurisdictional work considers only judicial
decision-making and finds no evidence of correction as we do here. See id. at 263-64, 275-76;
see also infra Part III.B-C.
5. But cf. Brian D. Johnson et al., Ethnic Threat and Social Control: Examining Public
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This Article addresses both deficiencies. First, we examined the
anatomy of a subset of criminal offenses from arrest to sentencing
at several critical junctures, and, second, we accounted for puzzling
differences between Hispanic and white defendants, as well as
between Hispanic and black defendants. Our findings suggest that
racial minorities6 still fare worse than white defendants, especially
at the time of arrest.7 Even if such differences arise in law enforce-
ment practices, we found strong evidence that the judicial process
self-corrects by offsetting—or at least narrowing—these gaps as the
prosecution’s case develops.8
Our empirical analysis focuses exclusively on driving while
intoxicated (DWI), also known as driving under the influence (DUI),
a decidedly major public health issue.9 As of 2009, DWI arrests were
the second-most common offense across the United States.10 State
legislatures have responded to the threats posed by drunk driving
through tough laws designed to deter DWI offenses and punish
perpetrators.11 The underlying assumption has been that, by
enacting stricter laws, legislatures will be one step closer to
accomplishing their task of reducing DWI incidence.12 However,
prior evaluations of these laws, which often used state-level panel
data, have yielded mixed results with respect to the laws’ effects on
Support for Judicial Use of Ethnicity in Punishment, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 401, 407-08 (2011)
(testing hypotheses related to the relationship between the size of the Hispanic population
and the salience of ethnicity in sentencing).
6. Hereinafter, the phrase “racial minority” encompasses both racial and ethnic minority
status.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part III.B-C & Table 6.
9. In this Article, we use data from North Carolina, which uses the label DWI to denote
the criminal offense. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1 (2013). Henceforth, we only refer to DWI,
although one could generalize our findings to DUI depending on the jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381 (2013). 
10. Howard N. Snyder & Joseph Mulako-Wangota, Arrests by Age in the U.S., 2009,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
11. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381 (requiring any motor vehicle operated after
a DUI conviction to include a certified ignition interlock device). The device takes a breath
sample before the car will start. Id. § 28-1301; see also Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary
Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961,
963.
12. See Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Alcohol-Control Policies and Motor-Vehicle Fatalities,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 161 (1993).
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motor vehicle mortality, binge drinking, and DWI.13 These inconclu-
sive findings suggest that we cannot merely legislate our way out of
the problem. After enactment, the manner in which local law
enforcement implements new statutes greatly affects the realization
of legislative objectives.
Our empirical understanding of the interaction between legal
interventions and social behavior remains incomplete because there
are many links in the causal chain between passing laws and
improving safety. These factors include: (1) the extent to which
police enforce the laws and investigate crimes; (2) how prosecutors
and courts handle DWI arrests; (3) policies and practices of the
corrections system; and (4) how people respond to sanctions and
complementary policies involving substance abuse treatment.14
Each stage can be highly complex, and most are understudied. In
particular, very little is known about how prosecutors and judges
handle the wide variety and volume of cases that appear before
them.15 To the extent that these issues have been studied at all,
research has focused on higher-level offenses such as capital
13. See id. at 162, 164, 184 (studying forty-eight states’ alcohol deterrence laws); Koyin
Chang et al., The Effectiveness of Alcohol Control Policies on Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities
in the United States, 45 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 406, 406-07, 413 (2012)
(determining the effectiveness of various alcohol-related motor vehicle laws); William N.
Evans et al., General Deterrence of Drunk Driving: Evaluation of Recent American Policies,
11 RISK ANALYSIS 279, 279, 282-83, 287-88 (1991) (finding no specific punitive laws
contributed to success of national campaign against drunk driving); Donald S. Kenkel,
Drinking, Driving, and Deterrence: The Effectiveness and Social Costs of Alternative Policies,
36 J.L. & ECON. 877, 878-79, 884, 889-93 (1993) (comparing deterrence policies and alcohol-
control policies, with an emphasis on relative social costs); Christopher J. Ruhm, Alcohol
Policies and Highway Vehicle Fatalities, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 435, 437, 439, 450-51 (1996)
(finding increased alcohol tax rates most effective); Frank A. Sloan & Penny B. Githens,
Drinking, Driving, and the Price of Automobile Insurance, 61 J. RISK & INS. 33, 34, 48-52
(1994) (analyzing the relationship between insurance costs, drunk driving, and state
intervention); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Prices, Civil and Criminal Sanctions, and Law
Enforcement on Alcohol-Related Mortality, 55 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 454, 455-56, 463 (1994)
(studying the effectiveness of alcohol-control policies as measured by alcohol-related
mortality); Alexander C. Wagenaar et al., General Deterrence Effects of U.S. Statutory DUI
Fine and Jail Penalties: Long-Term Follow-Up in 32 States, 39 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 982, 982-83, 992 (2007) (studying the effects of mandatory minimum penalties);
Kathryn Whetten-Goldstein et al., Civil Liability, Criminal Law, and Other Policies and
Alcohol-Related Motor Vehicle Fatalities in the United States: 1984-1995, 32 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 723, 724-26, 729-30 (2000) (analyzing alcohol and motor vehicle
fatalities in relation to civil and criminal liability).
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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crimes.16 Although capital offenses are responsible for more harm
per crime than DWIs, they are fewer in number.17 Further, although
a substantial amount of research has dealt with policing and
arrests, comparatively little attention has been paid to downstream
decisions following those same arrests.18
Based on the background fact that stop and arrest rates for DWI
offenses are higher for black men—and even more so for Hispanic
men—than their population shares would predict,19 this Article
primarily addresses two questions about racial disparities and
criminal process: (1) Do decisions after arrest, both by prosecutors
and the courts, significantly differ according to race and gender? and
(2) Is there evidence of correction mechanisms that mitigate adverse
outcomes experienced at earlier stages of criminal processing? We
analyze the first question using regressions with and without
controls for socioeconomic attributes that should be systematically
related to defendants’ demographic characteristics. Answers to the
second question arise from comparing differential outcomes in
successive stages of the prosecution and trial, namely, whenever all
available evidence suggests errors in arrest or charging that a
presiding judge later remedies. Correction of differential outcomes
among DWI defendants sheds light on the roles of prosecutorial and
judicial discretion in the U.S. criminal justice system. Although we
detect beneficial, warranted discretion in these data, we recognize
16. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 35-37, 105
(1984); Samuel R. Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1275, 1275, 1305, 1321-22 (1985);
Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the
Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 783-84, 798-99
(1981); Marian R. Williams & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Racial Disparity and Death Sentences in
Ohio, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 207, 210, 214 (2001). For an overview of studies of the deterrent effect
of death penalty regimes, see generally NAT’L RESEARCH COMM. ON DETERRENCE & THE DEATH
PENALTY COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (Daniel S.
Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012).
17. See Snyder & Mulako-Wangota, supra note 10.
18. See sources cited supra note 3. For recent examples of analysis that extends beyond
the stop decision, see IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE
OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2008), available at http://www.
aclusocal.org/issues/police-practices/racially-disparate-outcomes-in-the-los-angeles-police-
department/; Nicola Persico & Petra E. Todd, The Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Motor-
Vehicle Searches, 25 JUST. Q. 37, 37-39 (2008).
19. See infra Part II.B.
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that discretion can also be used to socially undesirable and perhaps
even unconstitutional ends.20
We investigate DWI arrests in North Carolina (NC) for impor-
tant analytical reasons. First, although common, DWIs are atypical
in that charges are often based on a biological test, which involves
sampling a driver’s breath or blood to gauge its blood alcohol
concentration (BAC).21 The implication is that evidence supporting
charges and convictions is arguably more limited and straightfor-
ward than for many other crime types. Second, focusing on a single
offense rather than on a wider array of offenses avoids many of the
difficulties generated by unobserved heterogeneity across offense
types. Third, studying one offense type across many or all states
must account for jurisdiction-specific effects in, at best, crude
ways—that is, using fixed effects regression models. Our exclusive
focus on NC reduces jurisdictional variation to the prosecutorial and
judicial districts within the state as opposed to across the country.22
Although there are differences in severity, even for a single offense
type such as DWI, such variation is small relative to offenses in the
aggregate. Reducing both observed and unobserved heterogeneity
in crime severity is a useful step toward addressing equality of
outcomes among ostensibly similar arrestees. Fourth, the adminis-
trative data available for NC are exceptional, and although DWI
laws, drinking culture, and the availability of public transportation
certainly vary among the states, the underlying legal processes are
very similar. Finally, one’s prior convictions for drunk-driving
offenses are the only criminal records that matter in sentencing for
a misdemeanor DWI. Having constructed prior DWI records for
20. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (“As we have noted in a slightly
different context, however, although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not unfettered.
Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is ... subject to constitutional constraints.”
(quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979))) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1919-21 (1992) (discussing the possibility that plea bargains are achieved under duress).
21. In North Carolina a BAC of 0.08 or more is sufficient for a DWI charge. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-138.1 (2013).
22. In a recent analysis of over 5000 felony defendants in an urban Ohio jurisdiction,
Wooldredge found, once other factors such as offense severity and criminal history were
included as controls, that black men did not differ relative to whites in: (1) the odds of being
released on their own recognizance; (2) bond amounts assessed; and (3) prison sentences. See
John Wooldredge, Distinguishing Race Effects on Pretrial Release and Sentencing Decisions,
29 JUST. Q. 41, 42, 56-57 (2012).
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every arrestee in the dataset, we can confidently attest that the data
capture every objective measure that could influence sentencing
outcomes. To our knowledge, no previous study has tracked
outcomes for arrestees in any crime category from the initial arrest
through sentencing, particularly for an administrative entity as
large as a state. A host of other work has examined differential
enforcement behavior by highway officers, with at least one study
exclusively using data from NC.23
A complete overview of the criminal process permits a discussion
that extends beyond identifying racial disparities. Pointing out ways
in which law enforcement and prosecutors make decisions that seem
to correlate more with demographic characteristics than underlying
risk or true guilt assuredly matters to our understanding of how
well the system functions. The most consequential contribution of
this Article is our substantial evidence of how those misperceptions
are remedied as the case unfolds before subsequent actors, namely,
prosecutors and judges. Because there is almost no work examining
the complete anatomy of a criminal case, we are confident that our
results are also the first to detect internal correction outside of the
appeals process.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches
the procedural issues of interest, with reference to the theory and
practice of DWI case disposition in NC. In Part II, we discuss the
unique dataset used, the Automated Criminal and Infraction
System (ACIS), and review descriptive statistics on racial and ethnic
disparities at key decision points. Part III details the regression
analysis at these same stages, from the setting of pretrial release
conditions to incarceration sentence lengths. Part IV presents our
interpretation of the empirical findings, specifically that prosecu-
tors, judges, and even defendants make decisions that generate
consequential and robust differences by race and gender. Evidence
exists, especially in the context of prosecutorial declinations and
judicial sentencing, that correction mechanisms reduce racial and
gender-based differences as a case winds its way through the
system. Specifically, Hispanic males are subjected to some of the
23. See Patricia Warren et al., Driving While Black: Bias Processes and Racial Disparity
in Police Stops, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 709, 717, 729-31 (2006) (finding stronger evidence for racial
bias among local police officers making vehicle stops relative to highway patrol).
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more onerous pretrial release conditions but receive more prosecuto-
rial dismissals and relatively lighter sentence types.24 Part IV also
reviews alternative explanations for the findings in Part III and
addresses endogeneity issues that may affect the analysis. We
conclude with thoughts for further study.
I. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DWI CASE DISPOSITION
A. Theoretical Considerations
Empirical research on racial profiling by law enforcement has
focused on the difference between statistical25 and taste-based
discrimination,26 concepts borrowed from economics. The former
occurs when law enforcement officers are uncertain about offender
identity and must allocate scarce resources to detection.27 If there
are differences in crime propensity according to readily observable
characteristics, for example, race, gender, or neighborhood income,
then it is rational to allocate more resources to groups for which the
probability of crime is higher.28 On the other hand, taste-based
discrimination involves biased law enforcement behavior stemming
from an officer’s dislike of persons who are “different” or “other.”29
We do not extend this long line of research conducted on differen-
tials at the point of highway stops. In fact, if anything, our results
imply that exclusively focusing on stops may lead to false conclu-
sions because of corrective actions undertaken later. Rather, we
mention these models because of their applicability to subsequent
events in criminal procedure. Specifically, we test for evidence of
24. See infra Part III.B-C.
25. See Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor
Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175, 176, 178 n.8 (1977) (alteration in original) (quoting
LESTER C. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY 172 (1975)) (“[Statistical discrimination] occurs
whenever an individual is judged on the basis of the average characteristics of the group, or
groups, to which he or she belongs rather than upon his or her own determinations.”).
26. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (2d ed. 1971) (“[I]f
someone has a ‘taste for discrimination,’ he must act as if he were willing to forfeit income in
order to avoid certain transactions.”).
27. See Aigner & Cain, supra note 25, at 178 n.8.
28. See Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence
from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 163 (2009).
29. See BECKER, supra note 26, at 17; Persico & Todd, supra note 18, at 38-42.
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these disparities—without commenting on whether they are borne
of rational prediction or animus—in the way that officers of the
court handle DWI arrestees.
The first post-arrest decision usually involves the prosecutor
determining whether to charge the arrested individual and,
conditional on formal charges, the nature of the offense.30 Shortly
after detention, most individuals will appear before a magistrate to
learn of the filed charges.31 At that pretrial hearing, the magistrate
will set the release conditions, requiring the defendant to post bail
or a bond, or even a promise to appear.32 Setting bail achieves
several criminal justice goals: (1) conditioning pretrial release on
the severity of the charge; (2) increasing the probability of appear-
ance for offenses of a given severity level or, conversely, reducing
the probability of flight; and (3) deterring pretrial misconduct.33
Evidence from at least two studies points to discrimination in
bail setting. Ian Ayres and Joel Waldfogel used a market-based test
to locate bias in pretrial release.34 Their perspective focused on bond
dealers’ pricing behavior: higher relative costs for supplying bail for
defendants of a particular race should be reflected in relative pricing
differences by race.35 They found that blacks and Hispanics paid
bond dealers lower interest rates, indicating that dealers did not
regard minorities as greater flight risks.36 The authors argued that
any difference in rates should be attributable to discrimination in
bail setting.37 After eliminating competing explanations, Ayres and
Waldfogel concluded that New Haven courts discriminated against
blacks and Hispanics in bail setting.38 Another state-level analysis
using Bureau of Justice Statistics data from the 1990s found that
30. See DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, How Courts Work: Pre-trial Court
Appearances in a Criminal Case, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/
resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/pretrial_appearances.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2014).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See William M. Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 288, 336 (1974).
34. See Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail
Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 993 (1994).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 993-94, 1039.
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Hispanic defendants were disadvantaged at the pretrial stage in
three ways.39 Hispanics were the group most likely to have to pay
bail to obtain pretrial release, they were assessed the highest bail
amounts, and they were the least likely to actually pay for release.40
Legal scholars have characterized prosecutors as criminal law’s
gatekeepers because they decide the fate of arrestees well before
they appear before a judge or jury at trial.41 Usually an assistant
district attorney (ADA) will receive notice from law enforcement
about the facts and recommended charges.42 The ADA then faces a
two-step choice: (1) pursue or decline a conviction even after law
enforcement recommends charges; and (2) charge the arrestee with
the recommended or a lesser offense.43 A third option, related to the
second, permits the ADA to negotiate for a conviction through plea
bargaining.44 Given demands on prosecutor resources, budget
constraints, and political pressure, many charges are declined,
especially when evidence of guilt is lacking.45 Alternatively,
prosecutorial discretion may not offset higher arrest rates if racist
motivations predominate.46
Exercising prosecutorial discretion through declinations occurs
relatively infrequently in NC—about 19 percent by our calcula-
tions—because of statutory requirements.47 Still, there is far less
information on prosecutorial charging behavior than on judicial
39. See Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and
Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 CRIMINOLOGY
873, 883, 892 (2003).
40. See id. at 891 tbl.1, 892, 895-97.
41. James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 119, 130 (2009) (“Americans allow prosecutors degrees of discretion that
are unparalleled in the advanced democratic world.”); see Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998).
42. See DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 30.
43. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 148-53
(2008); Whitman, supra note 41, at 130.
44. See Whitman, supra note 41, at 130. For an example of prosecutorial discretion in plea
bargains at the federal level, see Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal
Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reduction in U.S. Federal
District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 397-98 (2010).
45. See Miller & Wright, supra note 43, at 148-49.
46. See generally Davis, supra note 41 (arguing for the use of prosecutorial discretion as
a remedy for racial discrimination).
47. See, e.g., Shermer & Johnson, supra note 44, at 397 (discussing limitations imposed
on federal prosecutors by the federal sentencing guidelines).
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sentencing decisions. Lauren Shermer and Brian Johnson reviewed
the limited empirical evidence on racial disparities in prosecutorial
treatment with mixed findings.48 The samples on which their
research was based are small and pertain to different crimes and
local jurisdictions.49
In addition to budget constraints and personal preferences,
prosecutors must consider the overwhelming size of the state court
docket.50 This deluge of criminal cases has prompted Professors
Gershowitz and Killinger to observe: “[M]any prosecutors are asked
to commit malpractice on a daily basis by handling far more cases
than any lawyer can competently manage.”51 Thus, some of the
unexplained discrepancies in plea bargain outcomes may result
from ADAs’ adopting heuristics about the propensity for racial
minorities to be guilty of, or willing to plead guilty to, DWI offenses.
Finally, we note the importance of so-called “executive exclusion” as
a source of unobserved heterogeneity. This practice involves the
prosecutor declining the case and therefore, “avoid[ing] the wasted
effort” of using evidence likely to spur a defense motion to exclude
that might ultimately lead to a dismissal.52 Our data do not include
information on the probative value of evidence from the arrest site.
It is possible, therefore, that, independent of prosecutorial zeal or
resource constraints, some declinations or bargains reflect a
prosecutor’s reasoned judgment that he might not secure a convic-
tion through the default process.
Rates of plea agreements in the United States now exceed 90
percent,53 and their overwhelming use is justified by appeals to
rational allocation of scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources.54
48. Id. at 399-400, 424.
49. See id. at 396-97.
50. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 263-65 (2011).
51. Id. at 263.
52. See Miller & Wright, supra note 43, at 137-38.
53. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118, 1119 & n.2 (2011).
54. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“The potential to conserve valuable
prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable
terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties.”); see also
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by
agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea
bargaining,’ is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered,
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In effect, defendants are choosing the certainty of some sanc-
tion—but at a reduced level—over a probabilistic sanction following
trial with a higher expected value.55 Given this uncertainty, the plea
bargain is an insurance device for both the defendant and the
state.56 But in some cases, defendants may be induced to accept a
plea agreement when the expected value of pleading not guilty
exceeds the bargain’s value.57 Whether the reverse is true more
often for nonwhite defendants is a question that we address in our
empirical analysis.58
A related concern is that the quality of one’s defense, which
plausibly correlates with race and ethnicity in addition to income,
wealth, and educational attainment, affects case resolution.
Defendants possess limited choice in selecting defense counsel; they
can represent themselves, obtain state-financed counsel if indigent,
or privately retain their own attorney. If DWI defendants select
public counsel, they cannot choose whether a public defender or a
court-appointed private attorney will provide representation.59
Seventy-four of the one hundred NC counties do not staff public
defenders;60 by definition, using a publicly subsidized legal service
it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States
and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and
court facilities.”).
55. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L.
& ECON. 353, 353-55 (2006); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L.
& ECON. 61, 61, 66, 68 (1971).
56. Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 749, 749 (1983) (emphasis omitted).
57. A related concern is that by threatening defendants with multiple charges and
onerous sentences proscribed by statute, prosecutors have gained too much power relative to
defendants. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876-84 (2009); William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2254-58
(2004). Enacting mandatory minimum sentencing laws may have increased prosecutorial
discretion by giving the prosecutor a threat, that is, a minimum sentence attached to a charge,
with which to extract a plea to a lower charge not covered by the minimum sentence law. See
David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 603-06 (2005) (empirically analyzing
the effects of a three-strikes law). Whether on average a guilty plea results in lower penalties
remains an unsettled issue, even among experts.
58. See infra Part III.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2004).
60. See N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., N.C. PUB. DEFENDER DIRECTORY, http://
www.ncids.org/State%20Defender%20Offices/Directory%20Pages/Public%20Defender%20
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in these locations implies representation by members of the general
state bar. In turn, if blacks and Hispanics tend to enjoy lower
quality representation because they choose to appear pro se or have
less zealous counsel, the probability of conviction may be higher and
penalties more adverse.61 Although we might expect private counsel
to exert more effort, to the extent that effort yields “wins” followed
by improved reputational and pecuniary rewards at the margin, the
relative performance of public defenders and court-appointed
attorneys is unclear based solely on the financial incentives they
face. For one, NC judges place caps on public expenditures for court-
appointed counsel on a case-specific basis.62 Thus, after expending
some effort, financial rewards to court-appointed work may be
limited.63 Financial rewards also diminish with limits on hourly
fees.64 Public defenders are paid a salary that arguably does not
increase as a function of one’s win rate. On the other hand, this
“market for representation” framework may exaggerate the role of
price signals.
In one empirical study of the issue, Radha Iyengar found that
public defenders are more effective in achieving acquittals for their
clients than court-appointed defense counsel.65 Given the high
proportion of arrests resolved by guilty pleas, defense attorneys play
an important role advising clients about accepting the ADA’s plea
offer. As of the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,
defense attorneys must discuss the collateral consequences of a
conviction, including deportation, with their clients.66 James
Directory.pdf (last updated Feb. 24, 2014). 
61. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look
at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 447-50 & tbl.1 (2007).
62. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 468 S.E.2d 840, 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
indigent counsel fees and expenses are awarded at the discretion of the trial court).
63. See id.
64. Fees for publicly supplied counsel are determined at the state level by the NC Office
of Indigent Defense Services. See Michael Hewlett, Forsyth Defense Attorneys Off Court
Appointed Lists, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 6, 2011. A recent reduction in the hourly
compensation for court-appointed work resulted in many attorneys removing themselves from
the supply of willing lawyers. Id. Practically, this development may result in less experienced
attorneys taking court-appointed cases. Id.
65. See Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense
Counsel 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,187, 2007).
66. 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (citations omitted) (“[W]e have long recognized that the
negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
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Anderson and Paul Heaton similarly discovered high success rates
with public defenders in murder cases exploiting initially random
assignment of lawyers in Philadelphia.67
The remaining stages involve the presiding judge’s discretion in
deciding the basic conviction status and, conditional on a guilty plea
or guilt following trial, any sentences and nonincarceration
sanctions, such as supervised probation. A major decision involves
the location of incarceration, whether in a county jail (where the
vast majority of convicted DWI offenders are held) or a state prison
(where most convicted DWI felons and persons sentenced to lengthy
terms are placed). Understanding judicial sentencing patterns,
which perhaps has been more vexing than locating the determinants
of prosecutorial discretion, requires attention to similar kinds of
unobserved, idiosyncratic decision inputs as well as legislatively
mandated norms, like sentencing guidelines. The NC Legislature
has prescribed certain minimum sanctions for DWI offenses, and
the sentencing judge must report in writing all evidence regarding
factors that affect the ultimate sentence.68
Drawing on reports from state judiciaries, the distribution of
DWI sentences should be a function of individual judges’ assess-
ments of the severity of the offense, the quality of evidence, risk
assessments of the likelihood of recidivism, and prior experience
with DWI cases.69 Unlike prosecutors, the size of state budget
allocations to the criminal justice system should not have a
discernible effect on judicial decision-making. The effort required
when presiding over a case and handing down a sentence is much
less time-consuming and virtually costless relative to the prosecu-
tor’s job. Judges’ utility functions should therefore depend on their
accuracy in reaching decisions about guilt and fairness. In achieving
accuracy, judges seek to minimize Type I (false acquittals) and Type
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The severity of deportation ... only
underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk
of deportation.”).
67. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 183 (2012).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(c1) (2013).
69. See generally Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public
Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1404-11 (2008) (describing
risk assessments through which judges ascertain sanctions for individual offenders).
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II (false convictions) errors, the latter of which may lead to success-
ful appeals of their decisions.70 The American legal system is
designed to reduce the probability of Type II more than Type I
errors, and judges plausibly internalize this ordering. No consensus
exists among law and economics researchers on the arguments in a
judge’s utility function.71 Yet our empirical specifications capture
the essence of the underlying concepts. Fairness has two dimen-
sions: horizontal, treating similarly situated defendants equally,
and vertical, treating defendants convicted of more severe crimes
more harshly. Thus, all else equal, race and ethnicity should not
explain convictions conditional on a not guilty plea or sentence
severity unless minorities commit more serious DWI and concurrent
offenses and unless there is also a correlation between these
characteristics and some other relevant factor, for example the
probability of recidivism.
Finally, we mention the role that Hispanic identity and immi-
gration status may play in criminal proceedings given the relatively
high frequency of Hispanic defendants appearing in the data. Using
statistics from the 1995 National Alcohol Survey, Raul Caetano and
Catherine Clark found that Hispanic men were more likely to self-
report drinking and driving in the previous year (21 percent)
relative to black men (14 percent).72 Meanwhile, DWI arrest rates
for men during the past year were 1 percent each for whites and
blacks but 4 percent for Hispanics.73 Eleven percent of white and
black men responded that they had ever been arrested for DWI,
whereas 19 percent of Hispanic men reported affirmatively.74 These
data strongly suggest that the incidence of drinking and driving is
70. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive
to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 99-100 (1989). But see Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni
Zervogianni, Judges as Satisficers: A Law and Economics Perspective on Judicial Liability,
29 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 333, 345-46 (2010) (stating that the possibility of appellate review lacks
a deterrent effect).
71. Cf. Hugo M. Mialon et al., Judicial Hierarchies and the Rule-Individual Tradeoff, 15
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 3, 4 (2007) (claiming that the study of judicial behavior has been difficult
because “economists are unable to specify the details of judges’ utility functions”).
72. Raul Caetano & Catherine L. Clark, Hispanics, Blacks and Whites Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol: Results from the 1995 National Alcohol Survey, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
& PREVENTION 57, 59 tbl.1 (2000).
73. Id. at 62. No female respondents to the survey had been arrested for DWI during this
period. See id. at 59, 61.
74. Id. at 59.
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higher among Hispanic and white men than among black men, but
that Hispanic men are more likely to be arrested than are men in
the other demographic groups.
In Padilla, the Court held that a criminal defense attorney who
fails to inform a noncitizen client of his nearly certain deportation
following a guilty plea fails to satisfy the constitutional standard of
objective reasonableness.75 This failure could lead to the plea and
conviction being overturned under the Sixth Amendment’s ineffec-
tive assistance doctrine.76 Padilla may have two consequences. The
first would be that lawyers will be informed of or seek information
on the law regarding deportation and hence condition bargaining
with prosecutors on deportation consequences.77 The other, not
intended by the Court, would broaden the responsibility of defense
counsel to advise clients on a range of collateral consequences of
criminal convictions.78 Indeed, “[i]mmigration status affects the
proceedings from bail through execution of a sentence.”79 The
direction of this relationship is ambiguous; for some noncitizens, the
threat of deportation may result in denial of bail or probation on one
hand or, on the other, possible early release, albeit to initiate
deportation proceedings.80
75. 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2010). 
76. See id.
77. See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1395
(2011).
78. Id. at 1395-96.
79. Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration
Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2011).
80. Id. at 1421. Unfortunately, our data do not permit disaggregating observations on the
basis of legal residency. Among the limited, systematic evidence available, one study
compared sentencing outcomes by race and then by citizenship status. See Scott E. Wolfe et
al., Unraveling the Effects of Offender Citizenship Status on Federal Sentencing Outcomes, 40
SOC. SCI. RES. 349, 350, 354, 358 (2011). The authors concluded that blacks were more likely
to be incarcerated than whites among U.S. citizens, but there was no statistical difference in
the same probability between Hispanics and whites. Id. at 356 tbl.2. When citizenship status
entered the analysis, however, Hispanic citizens were sentenced to shorter incarceration
spells on average than whites. Id. at 357 tbl.4. But among illegal aliens, sentences were longer
for Hispanics than for whites. Id.
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B. DWI Case Processing in North Carolina
Law enforcement officers must have reasonable suspicion to
arrest a driver.81 The sources of such suspicion include erratic
driving behavior such as crossing the centerline, or observing
slurred speech or alcohol on the breath after pulling over the driver
for another infraction like speeding.82 Once the officer suspects that
the driver is impaired, he may conduct a field sobriety test before
arresting an individual for DWI.83 As long as the arresting officer
has reasonable grounds to believe the driver is intoxicated, the mere
act of driving on a highway or public roadway implies consent to
chemical analysis.84 The chemical screening is typically conducted
on-site using a portable breathalyzer and then again at the police
station using a more sensitive breath test.85 The mini-breathalyzer
can be used in lieu of or in addition to the field sobriety test, and
officers may use its results to establish reasonable suspicion for
arrest even though the evidence is not admissible in court.86 For the
test to be admissible evidence, the officer must conduct it on a
machine maintained at the police station, and the defendant has the
right to consult with an attorney as well as call a witness during
test administration.87
Because DWI arrests are warrantless, defendants charged with
the offense must appear before a magistrate or judge without
undue delay for arraignment and bail hearing.88 At this stage, the
81. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
82. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DWI DETECTION
AND STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTING B4-B5 (2004).
83. The National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration has attempted to
standardize field sobriety tests by providing guidelines for their use. See id. at 2-3. Standard
field sobriety tests include the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk and turn, and the one-leg
stand. Id. at 9.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (2013). Although consent to chemical analysis is implied,
the driver has the right to refuse testing; however, refusal results in license revocation for at
least one year. Id. § 20-16.2(a)(1). Officers also have the right to compel analysis under other
laws. Id.
85. See id. § 20-16.3(a)-(b).
86. Id. § 20-16.3(d).
87. Id. §§ 20-16.3(c), 20-16.2(a)(6). Although the defendant has the right to call a witness,
the test cannot be delayed more than thirty minutes. Id. § 20-16.3(a)(6). But denying access
to counsel after a DWI charge constitutes a constitutional violation. State v. Hill, 178 S.E.2d
462, 462 (N.C. 1971).
88. § 15A-501.
1384 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1365
defendant is informed of the charges, and a bond hearing is
conducted.89 NC uses several types of bonds. The least restrictive
option does not carry any financial obligation, just a written promise
to appear, which is followed by custodial release.90 More stringent
types involve some financial obligation but do not require payment
unless the bond is forfeited. Unsecured bonds, for example, require
a specific payment only when the defendant fails to appear for the
scheduled court date.91 Cash bonds are secured by deposits in the
full amount of the bail set.92 The most restrictive condition for
pretrial release is the secured bond. These instruments vary with
respect to collateral sources and may require security by mortgage93
or at least one solvent surety, such as a professional bondsman.94
During the preliminary hearing, few defendants have attorneys
present. Of those that do, all are privately retained; court-appointed
attorneys or public defenders do not enter the process until after the
initial appearance. The practical implication for indigent defendants
is that any amendments to their excessive or unduly burdensome
bond assignment cannot be remedied until after appointment of
counsel.
NC maintains two trial courts: district and superior.95 Although
our analysis does not disaggregate by court type, it effectively tracks
this difference because the vast majority of felony defendants are
tried before a superior court judge, whereas misdemeanants and
those charged with other violations appear in district courts. Only
superior courts empanel juries, which also hear appeals of misde-
meanor convictions.96
Defense attorneys often use the appeal process to effectively stay
the district court sentence, thus allowing their client time to
89. See id. § 15A-511.
90. See id. § 15A-531(4).
91. See id.
92. See id. A bond secured by a bail agent acting on behalf of an insurance company is
considered a cash deposit under the terms of the statute. See id. A bond secured by a
professional bondsman, though, is considered a secured bond. See id.
93. § 58-74-5.
94. See § 15A-531(4).
95. Superior courts have original jurisdiction for all felony cases; however, the initial
appearance for all DWI cases, including felonies, occurs in district court. §§ 7A-271, 15A-
601.
96. § 20-38.7.
2014] CORRECTIONS FOR RACIAL DISPARITIES 1385
produce mitigating factors such as attending substance abuse
counseling. In many cases, the DWI defendant will be charged with
at least one concurrent offense: a felony, misdemeanor, traffic
violation, or other infraction. Table 1 documents the most frequently
observed offenses within several of these categories.97
The ADA may file a felony DWI charge only for habitual DWI
offenders, that is, those with at least three convictions in the last
ten years.98 Non-felony convictions are governed by a fairly tight
statutory framework that determines both a sentencing level and
the sanction within each level.99 These crimes carry the possibility
of jail and thus, if the defendant is indigent, eligibility for publicly
supplied counsel.100 Sentencing levels range from one (most severe)
to five (least severe), including a special aggravated Level 1
classification.101 The statutory language refers to mitigating
factors—for example, driving with a BAC no greater than 0.09,
evidence of safe driving, willingness to enter substance abuse
treatment—and aggravating factors—such as driving with a BAC
at least 0.15, having a child in the vehicle, reckless driving, and
prior DWI convictions.102 Fines and imprisonment for Level 1
offenses may not exceed $4000 and two years, respectively, with
probation possible after thirty days.103 Level 5 offenses carry fines
capped at $200 and imprisonment of one day to two months.104
A sentencing judge, however, may place the defendant on pro-
bation and allow him to serve the one-day minimum as community
service.105 In NC, sentences of at least six months are gener-
ally served in state prisons operated by the Department of
97. See infra Table 1.
98. § 20-138.5. The state statutes include only one felony DWI charge: habitual DWI.
Concurrent felony charges may be filed when drunk driving results in serious injury or death,
for example, vehicular manslaughter. Id. § 20-141.4. The ADA may also charge the arrestee
with a completely different felony (for example, vehicular manslaughter) arising from the DWI
even if it is the defendant’s first DWI. Id.
99. Id. § 20-179(a).
100. § 15A-603(a).
101. See § 20-179.
102. See id. § 20-179(d)-(e).
103. Id. § 20-179(g). Note that penalties for Level 1 are not the most severe maximum;
aggravated Level 1 can lead to fines up to $10,000 and imprisonment up to three years, with
probation possible after 120 days. Id. § 20-179(f)(3).
104. § 70-179(k).
105. Id.
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Corrections.106 Thus, despite the appearance of mandatory sen-
tencing for DWI, the statutes actually set boundaries for judges to
locate defendants within and across culpability levels, exercising
considerable discretion in the process.107
II. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
A. The ACIS Data
The primary data source for our empirical analysis is the North
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), which houses
the Automated Criminal Infractions System (ACIS).108 Although the
complete ACIS files to which we obtained access are unique, the
ACIS contents are available to any requesting member of the public,
subject to statutory limitations and resource constraints.109 ACIS
contains separate records for each individual and criminal charge
organized by the day the charge was filed and lists the related state
statute and offense descriptions.110 We use data on arrests for DWI
and associated charges from 2001 to 2011, which cover all charges
tried in courts of general jurisdiction, including convictions that
subsequently led to enrollment in treatment courts. We use data
from 1998 to 2000 only for documenting prior DWI convictions. All
other charges associated with a particular DWI arrest are also
flagged.111
These data have several important advantages. First, they
permit analysis at the individual level of arrest as opposed to using
106. § 15A-1352.
107. § 20-179(f). The statute allows the judge to determine if the aggravating factors
“substantially outweigh” mitigating factors or if the aggravating factors are “substantially
counterbalanced” by mitigating factors. Id.
108. Automated Criminal/Infractions System (ACIS), N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/JData/Documents/Technology_ACIS_Facts.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. There are several types of DWI offenses in the ACIS data: DWI—Drugs,
DWI—Alcoholic Beverage, DWI—Second Offense, DWI—Third Offense, DWI—Fourth
Offense, Driving While Impaired, DWI—Driving Instructor, Driving w/0.1 or more Blood
Alcohol, DWI Level 1—DWI Level 5, DWI (0.10) Level 1—DWI (0.10) Level 5, Habitual
Impaired Driving DWI Commercial Vehicle, Commercial DWI Under Influence, Commercial
DWI >= 0.04, Commercial DWI Schedule I Controlled Substance. See ACIS, supra note 108.
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aggregate measures at the county or state level, as in many studies
of criminal behavior.112 Although the data do not contain a unique
identifier to link an individual’s records over time, they do contain
personally identifying information, including name, date of birth,
and gender, which we use to generate unique identifiers with
reasonable accuracy. Data on residential address at the time the
offense occurred also appears in ACIS, which we use for merging
ACIS data with socioeconomic indicators for census block groups. As
a result, these generated identifiers provide a second distinct
advantage: tracking the development of a case from the offense
through corrections outcomes. Information on how the defendant
arrived in court, for example, citation, warrant, and criminal
summons; the defendant’s choice, if any, of legal representation; and
the method of disposition, including verdicts and sentences, for
example, jail terms, fines, and license revocation, all appear in the
dataset. The method of disposition is listed in several categories,
such as trial or dismissal. Third, unlike NC, most states do not have
a central, standardized system for maintaining court records; data
must be obtained from individual courts.
As with any dataset, ACIS carries some disadvantages. Fore-
most among them is the lack of several pertinent individual
characteristics such as educational attainment, employment, or
household income. Instead, we use proxies for small areas in which
the arrested individual lived at the time of the arrest.113 Neverthe-
less, the structure of the ACIS data suggests the possibility of
conducting unique within-defendant analysis and examining certain
offenses across arrestees.
We organized the data into a file for index arrests, in which an
index arrest is defined as the first DWI occurring in each calendar
year from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2011. Thus, an
individual may have as many as eleven index offenses. Our baseline
dataset includes 517,629 index DWI arrests over the observational
112. See, e.g., Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both
Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 23-27 (2011) (reviewing the literature based
on aggregate data).
113. ACIS does not permit analysis of arrest probabilities because we do not observe
whether an individual committed a crime. We can, however, analyze the effects of prosecution
on a DWI charge and, conditional on a conviction, the probability of a DWI re-arrest during
the two years following an index arrest.
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period 2001 to 2011. Figure 1 graphically displays the sequential
disposition of all the arrest observations.114
To supplement the ACIS data, we used information on median
household income, the fraction of “expensive” homes115 as a measure
of household wealth, and the fraction of adults over age twenty-five
with less than twelve years of education as a measure of educational
attainment. The area data vary by year and by the census block
group in which the defendant’s address was located at the time of
arrest. A block group is much smaller than a zip code area, which
entails enhanced precision, but some interpersonal variation in
personal characteristics still remains even at this level of granular-
ity. We were unable to match about one-fifth of the sample because
of missing or overly general addresses, such as military bases or
trailer parks. In these cases, rather than lose observations, we
specified an additional covariate, “no match” which takes the value
“1” if the residential address did not appear in the census block
groups and “0” otherwise. Values of the block group variables were
set to “0” when the no match variables equaled “1.” The block group
data were purchased from Geolytics, a firm that offers data for
small geographic areas based on the U.S. Census, American
Community Survey, and other sources.
B. Descriptive Statistics
To establish a baseline comparison for arrestee outcomes, in
Figure 2 we juxtapose the mean percentage shares of white, black,
and Hispanic persons in the ACIS data against their corresponding
figures in the NC population for the years 2001 to 2011.116 Data for
the latter were gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau’s intercensal
estimates. Because both time series are relatively stable over this
period, we calculated the mean percentage share of each racial
group across the eleven years. That white residents are much less
likely to be arrested relative to their population share, and that the
reverse is true for Hispanics, becomes immediately clear. Somewhat
114. See infra Figure 1.
115. The index is based on the fraction of homes with values of at least $1 million with the
U.S. average set to “1.”
116. See infra Figure 2.
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unexpectedly, black North Carolinians were arrested, on average,
at the same rate as their representation in the population—just over
20 percent.
Even still, higher arrest rates among certain population
segments could track evidence about their higher risk rate. Here, we
use as an alternative baseline the shares of drivers on the road by
race and gender that drive while intoxicated. The best approxima-
tion at our disposal is the percentage distribution of motor vehicle
fatalities attributable to alcohol impairment. Not only is the
resulting accident an unambiguous endpoint, but it also is not
subject to potential biases in law enforcement or in post-arrest case
processing. The Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS),
maintained by the U.S. Department of Transportation, provides a
public-use file on such crashes. Data queries from the system
appear in Table 2.117 Limiting the sample to motor vehicle fatalities
of drivers in NC attributable to alcohol use from 2001 to 2010, only
10.2 percent of such fatalities involved Hispanic drivers, about half
of this group’s share of DWI arrests. Consistent with the arrest
data, Hispanic men accounted for the vast majority of deaths
incurred by Hispanic drivers. By contrast, the share of black drivers
(21 percent) is in line with their corresponding NC population
percentage. Furthermore, Hispanics’ representation in the FARS
data declined between 2001 and 2010, even though their total state
population share substantially increased over the same period.
DWI offenses are classified as felonies or non-felonies depending
on the nature of the stop and any prior related offenses committed
by the arrestee.118 The vast majority of DWI arrests in the ACIS
data, however, are not considered felonies. In fact, less than 1
percent are charged or convicted as felons. Thus, Table 3 displays
means for a subset of the available variables related to non-felony
charges during the observation period.119 The first column presents
aggregate information across all race/gender combinations, and the
remaining five columns include the same information for select
groups.120 We exclude remaining categories, such as “other” men and
117. See infra Table 2.
118. See supra Part I.B.
119. See infra Table 3.
120. See infra Table 3.
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women, even though they are included in the regression analysis,
because these categories comprise such a small percentage of the
data. Because of the large sample size, the vast majority of means
for the reported race/gender combinations are significantly different
at the 5 percent level.121
The first four rows of Table 3 show the mean rates of assignment
to the four bail/bond types identified above.122 These unadjusted
figures suggest that white defendants are more likely to face more
permissive pretrial release conditions. Comparing the means for the
promise to appear with secured bonds, white men receive the former
35 percent of the time, compared to 18 percent and 28 percent for
Hispanic and black men, respectively. On the other hand, white men
must post a secured bond 37 percent of the time, whereas black and
Hispanic male defendants confront the most restrictive condition at
rates of 49 and 46 percent, respectively. Pretrial release conditions
are important because of the disruptions they can cause to employ-
ment, time with family, and full access to counsel to mount a
defense.123 The incidence of prosecutorial declinations is relatively
equal for each group except Hispanic men, who see their cases
dropped most often, 30 percent of the time.124 Correspondingly, we
observe that not guilty pleas are rather infrequent, occurring in only
11 percent of overall pleas, which accords with the general observa-
tion that most criminal charges are disposed of through the plea
bargain.
Because we expect the quality and nature of legal representation
to affect pretrial bargaining and trial outcomes, we always account
for this variable in the regression analysis. Whether the defendant
receives private representation or foregoes a lawyer appears to
correlate with race and gender. Hispanic and black men are more
likely to appear pro se, at rates of 22 and 20 percent, respectively.
121. See infra Table 3. Exceptions are noted in the table.
122. See infra Table 3.
123. Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at
Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13-14, 17-21 (discussing the difficulties defense
counsel faces when clients remain incarcerated before trial); Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings:
A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1951 (2005) (“By
cutting defendants off from family, friends, and jobs and subjecting them to the indignities
of detention, prosecutors place defendants in a position where they face great incentives to
plea bargain to end or minimize the detention.”).
124. Infra Table 3.
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White men and women are much more likely than any other group
to retain private counsel, at rates of 66 and 64 percent, respec-
tively.125 Use of publicly provided counsel, however, does not seem
to depend on race, ethnicity, or gender. Because the availability of
public defenders and court-appointed counsel where public defend-
ers’ offices are not staffed does not depend on demographic factors,
the differences by race, ethnicity, and gender appear much more
muted.
Following trial, each of the race/gender groups is on average
convicted, conditional on a not guilty plea, between 59 and 66
percent of the time.126 Hence, about a third of defendants who either
are confident that the prosecutor has erred in bringing charges or
who are willing to take their chances in front of the judge seem to
escape sanction. Among those who are convicted, though, white men
and women receive fines more often than Hispanic and black men.
Yet the unconditional fine amounts are skewed toward men
regardless of race or ethnicity. Black and white men must pay about
$214 for a DWI conviction, but black and white women are fined
$177 and $186, respectively. With respect to incarceration in the
county jail or state prison, white men, white women, and black
women are more likely to be sent to the former. Interestingly,
Hispanic men are almost never sentenced to prison terms. Because
of the differential rates of jail and prison sentences, black men face
the most time behind bars (about 174 days), approximately two
weeks more than white men and over a month more than white and
black women. The incidence and length of supervised probation also
seem to qualitatively follow the pattern for incarceration; black men
are more likely to receive supervised probation and receive the
longest probation terms.
On average, median household income in the block groups in
which arrestees resided was $41,000. White men and women lived
in areas with the highest incomes: $43,000 and $44,000, respec-
tively. For black men and women, the corresponding values were
$36,000 and $39,000. Arrestees resided in block groups with many
fewer expensive homes than the national average. Generally, the
fraction of persons with less than twelve years of schooling was 21
125. Infra Table 3.
126. The data in the remainder of this Part are based on the authors’ ACIS calculations.
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percent across block groups. Hispanic men lived in areas with the
highest fraction of persons with low educational attainment.
At this stage of the analysis, the apparently slight, but statisti-
cally significant, differences in magnitude across race and gender at
the various stages of the criminal process mask extensive heteroge-
neity in case characteristics, and the interactions between the
identity of defense counsel and the probability of conviction or
receiving a particular sanction. We now turn to regression analysis
separately conducted at various decision points to parse the
complicated interactions among these factors.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The following regressions isolate race and gender from the array
of permissible factors that might affect outcomes along the path
from arrest to sentencing. Consequently, we both avoid the pitfalls
of so-called included variable bias127 and focus on the noncausal
relationship between demographic factors and judicial outcomes.
Selection effects undoubtedly plague our empirical specifications;
however, we explicitly condition each iteration on some prior
outcome such as nondeclination or entering a not guilty plea. For
example, we do not analyze the conviction rate among all arrestees;
as our data show, the vast majority of non-felons and nearly all
felons plead guilty to a DWI offense, and those pleas result in
convictions. As long as we reasonably define the universe of relevant
defendants at each step of the analysis, selection effects are
relatively ignorable.128
127. See Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of “Included Variable Bias”
3-4 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/ayresin
cludedvariablebias.pdf.
128. See, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton et al., The Effects of Seeking Punitive Damages on the
Processing of Tort Claims, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 343, 345-46 (2005).
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A. The Empirical Model
For nearly all the results presented below, the empirical model
takes the form:
Outcomei = 0 + Xi +   *Attorney_Typei +   * Bond_Classi +
  * Concurrent_Offensesi +   * Area_Characteristicsi +  + i 
where i refers to individual arrests. The Outcomei variable is a
dichotomous measure of whether an event—for example, a convic-
tion conditional on a not guilty plea—occurs during case processing.
Xi is a vector of race/gender indicators and two other characteristics:
whether the defendant was charged with felony DWI and whether
the defendant had been convicted of any DWI in the two-year “look
back” period. Regardless of its use as the dependent variable or a
regressor, Attorney_Typei captures each of the defense counsel
possibilities with privately retained counsel as the omitted value,
and Bond_Classi tracks the pretrial release condition imposed
relative to the promise to appear. Concurrent_Offensesi are included
to help measure more precisely the attendant crimes charged that
should explain differential treatment aside from demographic
factors at each stage. These offenses can be felonies of variable
severity, such as felony death by vehicle; misdemeanors, like
possession of drug paraphernalia; traffic violations, such as hit and
run with property damage; or several other infractions, for example,
failure to wear a seat belt. The first three of these categories are
each divided into severity levels, which we enter as separate binary
variables in the regressions. Area_Characteristicsi includes the three
covariates for block groups defined above. Almost all of the regres-
sions use a logit estimator; the few OLS regressions include county
fixed effects. All regressions include year fixed effects (i). We do not
include fixed effects in the logit models because testing of the
difference between linear probability models with and without them
suggests negligible effects from inclusion.
Econometric analysis of trial and sentencing outcomes must
include a complete record of prior convictions given their admissibil-
ity as aggravating factors or even as evidence of a defendant’s
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recidivist tendencies.129 One of the more advantageous aspects of
studying DWI is that the only relevant prior record is drunk-driving
convictions. It does not matter that we do not have, and thus cannot
construct, full criminal backgrounds for each defendant. That we
can do so for DWI convictions sufficiently captures the effect that
recidivism has on adjudication and sentencing. Consequently, the
fully specified models below always include prior DWI convictions
within the last two years as an element of the Xi vector.
B. The First Correction Mechanism: Prosecutors
The first set of outcomes we explored relates to how magistrates
set pretrial release bail or bond. Recalling the four broad classes of
release conditions—(1) promise to appear/custodial release/pretrial
release; (2) unsecured bond; (3) cash; and (4) secured bond—we
estimate Equation (1) with Bond_Class as the dependent variable
and various subsets of the remaining regressors included. The
ordered structure of the dependent variable means that larger odds
ratios correspond to increased odds of the higher bond values. Thus,
although we do not estimate the likelihood of receiving each pretrial
release condition, we can say something about the relative likeli-
hood of receiving more onerous conditions. Column 1 of Table 4
displays odds ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals from an
ordered logit regression in which the dependent variable is se-
quenced as above with respect to perceived severity.130 The point
129. See, e.g., Oren Gazal-Ayal et al., Do Sentencing Guidelines Increase Prosecutorial
Power? An Empirical Study, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 151 (2013) (“In all steps, the
prior criminal record of the defendant also seems to be a significant variable in the decision
to impose a prison sentence.”); Cassia Spohn et al., The Effect of Race on Sentencing:  A
Re-Examination of an Unsettled Question, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 71, 75-76, 80 (1981-
1982) (indicating significant effort to include defendants’ criminal records and reinforcing
“the importance of ... legal factors, including prior criminal record, in explaining sentence
severity”).
130. See infra Table 4. Odds ratios give intuitive measures of relative risk, that is, the
increased or decreased probability of the specified outcome occurring. The reference value is
1. This odds ratio is equivalent to no change in probability due to the explanatory factor. Odds
ratios greater than 1 suggest increased probabilities, and odds ratios less than 1 suggest
decreased probabilities. The specific value above or below 1 denotes the magnitude. Thus, an
odds ratio of 1.25 on the variable “black male” means that being a black male increases the
probability of an outcome by 25 percent, whereas an odds ratio of 0.75 means a 25 percent less
chance. Finally, 95 percent confidence intervals tell the reader the estimated range of values
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estimates suggest that Hispanic men are 86 percent more likely to
receive a more taxing release mandate than white men and that this
relationship is less pronounced for black men. White women, on the
other hand, are 23 percent less likely to receive more onerous
pretrial release conditions.
Column 2 indicates that the same pattern holds for whether the
release condition carries any monetary payment, and Column 3
reports differences with respect to the amount of those payments
using ordinary least square regressions.131 In total, magistrates
seem to set cash payments or bond amounts $330 higher for black
men than white men and add stricter qualifications, for example,
collateral property, for Hispanics and black men. One reason for
Hispanic arrestees receiving less lenient treatment could be the
higher perceived flight risk among undocumented immigrants.
Whether black males suffer from outright animus or statistical
discrimination over the probability of flight or culpability is a
question we cannot reliably address with these data alone.132
Felony DWI charges and prior DWI convictions predict bail/bond
amounts. As we expect, defendants charged with a felony DWI must
overcome significant barriers to release, with bond amounts set
about $8000 more than for non-felony arrestees.133 In addition to the
index offense, a prior DWI conviction also significantly increases the
set bail amount by about $240. When we account for the fact that
some of these conditions are cash payments versus bonds in Column
3, more restrictive pretrial release conditions lead to monotonic
increases in the monetary value of the release condition.
Despite the fact that the use of public defenders versus court-
appointed counsel is exogenous to the individual defendant,134 the
decision to appear pro se or pay for representation merits some
exploration. The first notable feature of Table 5 is the robustness of
that is 95 percent likely to include the true value of the estimated odds ratio. Provided that
the confidence interval does not contain the value 1, the associated odds ratio is statistically
significant at conventional levels (p < 0.05). For additional information on odds ratios, see
DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 730-33 (12th ed. 2014).
131. See infra Table 4.
132. The ACIS data permit some analysis of flight probability or bond forfeiture, though
to a limited extent because of missing observations on these variables.
133. See infra Table 4 (Column 3).
134. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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the odds ratios across all specifications.135 Reading across the rows
for each race/gender group, black and Hispanic men are much more
likely than white defendants of either gender to “choose” public or
self-representation.136 Black men are almost twice as likely as white
men not to retain private counsel, whereas white women are almost
indistinguishable from their male counterparts.137 The estimates in
Column 4 include all relevant explanatory variables yet essentially
tell the same story as the parsimonious model in Column 1.138 The
most interesting result is that felony DWI charges dramatically
increase the likelihood of public counsel or pro se representation.
Even after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics—which
unsurprisingly show that higher income reduces the odds of public
or pro se representation—defendants charged with the most serious
offense do not seek assistance from the private bar.
A prosecutor’s decision to withdraw or never pursue charges
opens the door to even more unobserved heterogeneity, primarily
regarding the quality of underlying evidence or office priorities
among different sorts of crimes. Nonetheless, the identity of
opposing counsel, which should act as a proxy for the effort required
to secure a conviction; the chance of recidivism, perhaps elevated by
an existing prior DWI conviction; and the existence of concurrent
charges should explain a great deal of the ADA’s decision calculus.
In Table 6 we observe pronounced differences among black males,
Hispanic males, and white females relative to the omitted group of
white males, but particularly among Hispanic male defendants.139
Specifically, when controlling for attorney type and characteristics
of the crime in the fully specified model in Column 5, Hispanic men
are 58 percent more likely to see charges dropped. Increases in the
fraction of adults with less than a high school diploma in the block
group increases the probability of declination. With block group
characteristics included, arrests of black men are no more likely to
be dismissed than arrests for white men. Even in specifications
excluding all other covariates, as in Column 1, the difference in
135. See infra Table 5.
136. See infra Table 5.
137. See infra Table 5.
138. See infra Table 5.
139. See infra Table 6.
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declination probabilities between black and white men is small.
Table 6 offers the first robust evidence that case processing by
an officer of the court positively corrects for potential error in arrest
and pretrial release patterns. Recall that Hispanic men were much
more likely to be arrested at rates exceeding their underlying DWI
risk than any other race/gender combination.140 ACIS distinguishes
between declinations with and without leave, that is, those for
which the prosecutor may refile charges or not. Hispanic men are
defendants in about 30 percent of all cases declined by prosecutors.
However, 78 percent of those declinations permit the prosecutor to
refile charges. The most common reason the state offers for
abandoning the case, at least temporarily, is that the defendant
cannot be located.141 Therefore, some of the more onerous pretrial
release conditions for Hispanic males could be justified by their
greater flight risk.
These data support a reading that, perhaps inadvertently, the
system is “self-correcting” at the declination stage. Prosecutors’
decisions to pursue a DWI case plausibly reflect their judgments
about guilt and risk after reviewing evidence collected by law
enforcement and the magistrate’s initial assessment.142 And one
could infer that the choice to decline serves as a correction of both
police officers’ and magistrates’ inaccuracies. Alternatively, higher
declinations could and seem to follow from a cost-benefit analysis
whereby office budget constraints or crime priorities counsel against
tracking down defendants that have eluded the criminal justice
system. Finally, a combination of both accuracy correction and
resource constraints could operate in tandem. Given the skew
toward declinations with leave among Hispanic male defendants, we
infer that prosecutors are opting to preserve attention and resources
on other defendants or crime categories. Presumably, some arrested
Hispanic males who should not be detained initially exit the
criminal justice system for legitimate reasons. Others may be guilty
140. See infra Figure 2; supra text accompanying note 116. 
141. Authors’ calculations are based on the ACIS data.
142. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An
Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1458 (2004) (“[T]he most
commonly cited reason for declining to pursue a prosecution was evidentiary concerns ....
Overall, one might infer from these findings that criminal investigators are not as well versed
in the fundamentals of evidence as they perhaps ought to be.”).
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of DWI and still escape justice. Regardless of the underlying
reasons, Tables 1, 3, and 6 provide substantial evidence that
prosecutor review offsets the disproportionately high arrest rates for
Hispanic males.
Our findings on the determinants of not guilty pleas are at once
fascinating and troubling. Hispanic men—and to a much lesser
extent black men—are significantly (both statistically and practi-
cally) less likely to enter a not guilty plea than their white counter-
parts, ranging from 51 to 59 percent, depending on the
specification.143 Including other important explanatory variables
does little to upset these estimates. In accordance with reasonable
expectations, the propensity to plead not guilty decreases
monotonically with the severity of pretrial release conditions. In
other words, assuming that bail conditions somewhat relate to
underlying guilt or innocence, defendants who have to pay more to
secure their release are also more likely to plead guilty. After
accounting for presumed attorney effort and the seriousness of the
index offense, mainly through the felony charge indicator, it is
difficult to pinpoint why minority men would exhibit such different
pleading behavior relative to white men. The answer could lie in
differential priors about fairness in the criminal justice system,
which would prompt Hispanic men to take the certain outcome
rather than a gamble over a higher expected punishment level.
Another possibility lies in the accounts of prosecutors pressuring
racial and ethnic minorities into accepting plea deals even when
prosecutors sense that the probability of conviction is much less
than certain.144 All we can say for sure is that, after controlling for
observable characteristics of the defendant and the crime, the
differential by race—but not by gender—is robust and larger than
one might naturally expect.
Our results for not guilty pleas therefore set up a reversal of the
prosecutorial correction story based on declination rates independ-
ent of the reason for declination. Once prosecutors decide to pursue
a DWI conviction, disparities reemerge in terms of the probability
of a guilty plea. Keeping in mind that only 11 percent of all arrests
143. See infra Table 7.
144. See Albert Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent
Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 564 (1978).
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in the data lead to a not guilty plea,145 the rest are disposed of
through either guilty pleas on the stated charge or plea bargains
with the ADA. Controlling for all other relevant factors, especially
observable characteristics of the crime, should generate indistin-
guishable estimates on the race/gender variables if prosecutors are
offering plea bargains or otherwise equally communicating with
defendants across the race/gender groups. Yet Table 7 clearly shows
that Hispanic men who remain in the system after declinations are
much more likely to be convicted through a guilty plea.146 We cannot
determine from these data whether that difference is due to
underlying differences in defendant risk preferences by race and
gender or prosecutor behavior. Regardless, we still detect dramatic
disparities after accounting for all conceivably important factors
that would encourage the defendant to plead one way or the other,
which raises the possibility that Hispanic men are treated ad-
versely, though not necessarily because of taste-based discrimina-
tion.
The narrative for convictions conditional on a not guilty plea is
perhaps the most straightforward because guilty pleas are so
prevalent. In other words, the shadow plea bargaining system
effectively weeds out cases that lack sufficient evidence or that rest
on the margin of acquittal. First, the casual result gleaned from the
unadjusted statistics, namely that conditional conviction rates were
roughly the same across race and gender, survives the multivariate
analysis.147 Once again, however, Hispanic males are more likely to
be convicted following a not guilty plea. In the most fully specified
model, the practical magnitude is a 10 percent greater likelihood
relative to white male defendants. This estimate is itself a signifi-
cant drop from the unadjusted result (25 percent greater odds), but
the fact remains that Hispanic men, after controlling for relevant
observable crime characteristics, lose at trial more often. Combining
the evidence from not guilty pleas and trial convictions, it might
also be true that those who roll the dice on a trial are less likely to
have some exculpatory evidence or helpful witness at hand.
Alternatively, given the higher propensity for Hispanic men to take
145. See infra Table 3.
146. See infra Table 7.
147. See infra Table 8 (Column 1).
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a non-trial conviction, the true rate of innocence among those who
proceed to trial might be higher. On this account, the results in
Table 8 would suggest differential treatment at trial that cannot be
explained on purely legal grounds.148 We are not suggesting that
judges are behaving in a discriminatory fashion. Rather, consistent
with our correction narrative,149 the innocence/guilt decision should
be subject to less discretion than sentencing after a guilty verdict or
plea. Thus, the puzzle focuses less on why Hispanic male outcomes
are relatively unfavorable when trials conclude and more on their
favorable sentencing outcomes in light of these higher conviction
rates.
Odds ratios for the defense counsel types agree qualitatively
with previous findings that public defenders perform better than
court-appointed counsel.150 Yet privately retained lawyers—the
omitted category in Table 8—implicitly achieve better acquittal
rates because the odds ratios on the three included types all exceed
unity. This finding seemingly burnishes the idea raised above that
higher financial incentives, such as non-capped fees for relatively
straightforward representation work in the average case, correlate
with defendants’ success before the presiding judge.151
C. The Second Correction Mechanism: Judges
Black men are noticeably sentenced to higher levels within the
statutory matrix than white men.152 The difference relative to white
men is about 15 to 27 percent,153 and the odds ratios suggest that
the levels are much higher for black men than for Hispanic men or
white women.154 Here, we no longer condition the analysis on
whether defendants enter not guilty pleas; instead we pool all
convicted defendants regardless of plea status, reintroducing any
upstream differences by race and gender. The dependent variable
in these ordered logit regressions is the numerically increasing
148. See infra Table 8.
149. See infra Part III.C
150. See Anderson & Heaton, supra note 67, at 179; Iyengar, supra note 65, at 3.
151. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
152. See infra Table 9.
153. See infra Table 9 (Columns 3 and 4).
154. See infra Table 9.
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sentence level, so that just as with the ordered logit pretrial release
condition regression,155 odds ratios greater than unity in Table 9
indicate an increased likelihood of more severe sentencing levels.
The dependent variable is constructed so that Level 5 misdemeanors
are coded “1” and felonies are coded “6.”
Comparing these estimates with those in Table 4, we again infer
some correction among the Hispanic male defendant population,
this time initiated by sentencing judges. Specifically, we found that
Hispanic men were significantly more likely to be assigned to more
restrictive pretrial release classifications and to have those condi-
tions tethered to monetary payments. When presiding judges reach
a sentencing decision, however, Hispanic men are between 13 and
15 percent less likely to receive the more severe sentences, and the
more severe corresponding penalties, than white men. On the other
hand, across all race/gender combinations, the relationship between
pretrial release conditions and sentencing levels is monotonically
increasing. That is, more burdensome pretrial release stipulations
correspond with tougher sentencing outcomes. As expected, perhaps,
individuals with higher imputed income receive less severe sen-
tences, whereas lower education is overwhelmingly associated with
more severe sentences.
The correction mechanism here likely results from variation in
the gravity of the index DWI by race; Hispanic males’ high rate of
pleading guilty, including through plea bargains; and judicial
discretion in imposing sentences within the guidelines matrix. Just
as with prosecutorial correction through higher declination rates, we
interpret the more lenient sentencing outcomes for Hispanic males
as downward adjustment of penalties for those who are convicted
through pleas and trial determinations. Because we have controlled
for collateral offenses, characteristics of the defendant, and
characteristics of the crime, any disparities that favor Hispanic
males could plausibly stem from judges reviewing law enforcement
evidence and prosecutor charges to calibrate sentences. On this
account, the closer scrutiny that Hispanic males receive early in
case processing is counterbalanced by some judicial forbearance
after conviction.
155. See infra Table 4.
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Finally, we analyze the precise sanctions that defendants receive
post-conviction after controlling for whether the individual pleaded
not guilty.156 Given the strong correlation between the imposition of
fines and sentencing to some jail time, black men are 22 percent less
likely to pay fines157 and 21 percent more likely to serve time in
prison158 relative to a very low baseline probability of prison
sentencing (2 percent in the aggregate data). Yet among all
incarcerated defendants, black men are sentenced to around four
days more jail time and two weeks less prison time than white
men.159 In the fully specified model for monetary sanctions, black
men are 22 percent less likely to be required to pay a fine.160
Hispanic men, as the descriptive statistics suggest, almost
uniformly complete any incarceration spells in county jail. Again,
our best conjecture relates, in part, to judicial correction. Such
inference appears logical when one combines the overwhelmingly
high odds ratios for this defendant group in Columns 1-3 of Table 11
and the significant, negative OLS estimates in Columns 1-2 of Table
12.161 Stated otherwise, Hispanic men serve most of their sentences
in county jail but for sentences much shorter than white men and,
by extension, black men. The narrative with respect to defense
attorneys effectively remains the same, with defendants represented
by court-appointed counsel more likely than any others to land in
prison rather than jail; however, sentence lengths across both
incarceration types are always higher for those represented by
public defenders.
In each of Tables 9 through 11, one specification includes
covariates for block group household income, the ratio of expensive
homes, and a measure of educational attainment. A $100,000
increase in income raises the probability that a fine is imposed by
60 percent,162 decreases the probability of a sentence to state prison
by 69 percent,163 and more than triples the probability of being
156. See infra Tables 9-11.
157. See infra Table 10 (Column 4).
158. See infra Table 11 (Column 5).
159. See infra Table 12 (Columns 2 and 4).
160. See infra Table 10 (Column 4).
161. See infra Tables 11-12.
162. See infra Table 10 (Column 4).
163. See infra Table 11 (Column 5).
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sentenced to county jail.164 There is no significant difference in
sentence length for prison, but jail terms are about two weeks less
for a $100,000 rise in income.165 Lower educational attainment leads
to a lower probability of a fine;166 an increase in the fraction of
adults with less than a high school diploma results in nearly a
quadrupling of the probability of state prison167 and a substantial
reduction in the probability of being sentenced to jail.168 There is no
statistically significant difference by educational level in sentence
lengths.169
For almost all of the above outcomes, the presence of expensive
homes as a proxy for wealth does not affect the probabilities of fine,
jail, prison, or sentence length. Because we also accounted for
attorney type, the effects for income and education are over and
above these effects, which tend to favor clients of private attor-
neys—those who face a lower probability of prison time but higher
probabilities of fines and jail time, and if anything, lower sentence
lengths. These results potentially point to unequal judicial outcomes
on the basis of socioeconomic status. This result is not new but
clearly reiterated by our findings.
IV. DISCUSSION
One fundamental proposition of the common law is that the legal
system should treat equals equally.170 Yet another reflects the right
of individuals to be heard in court,171 which allows for the possibility
that some will be more effective in presenting their cases before the
court than others. Thus, to some extent, the goals of horizontal
equity—equal treatment of equals—and vertical equity—proportion-
ality of outcomes across cases—rest in tension with the defendant’s
164. See infra Table 11 (Column 3).
165. See infra Table 12 (Columns 2 and 4).
166. See infra Table 10 (Column 4).
167. See infra Table 11 (Column 5).
168. See infra Table 11 (Column 3).
169. See infra Table 12.
170. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 572
(2012).
171. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 86 (2011) (“What about individuals
hoping to get into court ...? ... [F]airness entails access rights for those standing at the door.”).
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right to act self-interestedly.172 Even within the class of DWI
offenses, the subtleties of specific cases, for example, the endless
combinations of concurrent offenses with which the defendant may
be charged beyond the index DWI, substantially increase the
complexity of classifying any individual’s alleged crime. Very few
presumably support “trial by formula” in the criminal context.173
The best that our system of justice can hope for is some amount of
prosecutorial and judicial discretion to make necessary judgments
about charging, conviction, and sentencing, coupled with effective
internal crosschecks. Although legislatures, especially Congress,
have moved in the direction of limiting judicial discretion in
sentencing, the need to preserve discretion appropriately limits the
automation of criminal law decisions by formula that some suspect
would generate outcomes purged of race, gender, or other character-
istics.174
Reflecting the conflicting objectives of promoting equal outcomes
for similarly situated parties, the liberty interest in presenting one’s
best case, and the inevitable heterogeneity of underlying facts, prior
empirical studies have consistently demonstrated that law enforce-
ment decisions and treatment in the courts are not equal across all
citizens.175 The findings presented in this Article, cataloging the
anatomy of DWI arrest resolutions in a single state, are no excep-
tion. Yet our unique findings with respect to downstream correc-
tions signal a more complete and possibly hopeful account of
criminal processing in the United States. Much of the hand-
wringing over the pitfalls of discretion assumes that it will be
targeted toward unjustifiably lenient or harsh prosecution and
sentencing. The results for Hispanic male defendants complicate
this conventional wisdom. As the case unfolds, usually at a more
rapid pace than for other serious crimes, judicial actors can weigh
objective evidence more carefully and ensure more equitable
outcomes.
Throughout this discussion, it is critical that the reader not
misunderstand our conjectures about correction as indictments of
172. See Lahav, supra note 170, at 573.
173. But cf. id. at 612-21.
174. See Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 764-66 (2012).
175. See supra notes 3, 16.
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law enforcement officers or prosecutors for discriminatory behavior.
Whether actual discrimination, statistical or taste-based, influences
decisions is not something we test for in this Article. As an empirical
matter, nevertheless, Hispanic men are arrested at rates far higher
than their underlying incidence of drunk driving would suggest as
proportionate. They are also convicted more often than white
defendants, but are not pursued as often by prosecutors and given
more lenient sentences. At most this information implies that
enforcement and prosecutorial resources might be inefficiently
utilized in ways that disadvantage minority citizens and require
downstream rectification. Likewise, judicial sentencing decisions
and even prosecutor declinations are not, standing alone, indicative
of altruistic intent. Our data on declinations reveal that most
declinations involving Hispanic arrestees allow the prosecutor to re-
file charges, and we do not have direct evidence that judges are
treating Hispanic males found or pleading guilty more softly. We
believe that in the former case, resource constraints, and in the
latter, a review of the entire pre-sentencing record, explain much
more of the correction mechanisms observed in the data.
Even though disposition outcomes tend to be less favorable for
Hispanic and black men relative to their white counterparts, we
observed significant variation between the two minority groups.
What they shared in common was a much lower propensity to retain
private counsel or appear pro se than white men charged with DWI.
The overall proportion of defendants appearing pro se, almost 20
percent, certainly is surprising. We conjecture that both the
aggregate statistic and the differentials by race follow from poor
information about the sanctions available for more severe DWI
offenses or, even more likely, from bias in defendants’ expected
value over the likely sanctions for their individual cases.176 Perhaps
176. Unfortunately, few studies exist on the formation of beliefs about criminal law
outcomes generally. For some recent exceptions, see Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran,
Testing a Bayesian Learning Theory of Deterrence Among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2011); Mandeep K. Dhami et al., Canadian and Spanish Youths’ Risk
Perceptions of Drinking and Driving, and Riding with a Drunk Driver, 46 INT’L J. PSYCHOL.
81 (2011); Lance Lochner, Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System, 97 AM.
ECON. REV. 444 (2007); Thomas A. Loughran et al., On the Ambiguity in Perceptions of Risk:
Implications for Criminal Decision Making and Deterrence, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 1029 (2011).
These studies place relatively more emphasis on the probability of arrest than on penalties
conditional on arrest, and on juvenile rather than adult risk perceptions. Additional studies
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thinking that a DWI conviction will result in a license suspension
at worst, defendants unfortunately miscalculate not the probability
of conviction, but the sentencing level or punishment within levels.
Part of the miscalculation could be inescapable; with judicial
discretion comes some uncertainty. But the high rate of pro se
litigation implies that DWI defendants underappreciate the value
of formal representation. For those at the margin of indigence, our
results indicate that expending some resources on private counsel
should lead to more salutary conviction and sentencing outcomes.
Despite these similarities, the differences between Hispanic and
black men are more pronounced, in no small part because of the
correction mechanisms documented by our empirical analysis. For
example, the fraction of Hispanics in the pool of DWI arrestees was
about four times their fraction in the total NC population, whereas
the same two proportions were fairly similar for blacks. Among all
male arrestees, representation in ACIS was far higher than
percentage shares in the state population. DWI arrests of Hispanic
women were so rare, however, that our estimates were extremely
imprecise and therefore not sufficient for comparison with white or
Hispanic men. Rates of prosecutorial declinations were far higher
for Hispanic than for black or white men, suggesting that prosecu-
tors often weed out arrests of Hispanic men with weak supporting
evidence of guilt or because of pressure from immigration enforce-
ment. Our analysis of FARS data for NC indicates that Hispanics
are substantially overrepresented among DWI arrestees in the
state. Thus, we find no support for an alternative hypothesis that
the arrest rate is accurate and that correction by the criminal justice
system is unwarranted.
The other major difference between Hispanic and black males
arrested for DWI was that, even after accounting for socioeconomic
characteristics of the block groups in which they resided, black men
were more likely to be sent to state prison than their white and
Hispanic counterparts. Prison sentences were extremely rare events
among Hispanic defendants. Even though many were sent to county
jail, their sentences tended to be about a week shorter relative to
white men sentenced to jail, and jail sentence lengths were much
of risk perception among adults as they apply to the various phases of the criminal disposition
process should be conducted. 
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shorter than for those defendants sent to state prison.
One final reason, aside from judicial correction, might explain
why Hispanic individuals in the ACIS data exhibit such patterns.
We have mentioned that immigration law and deportation threats
can intersect in important ways with criminal law more generally.177
Specifically, Congress significantly amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act in 1996, including the addition of § 287(g), part of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act.178 This provision allows local law enforcement agencies to
partner with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in
the removal of illegal aliens charged with crimes.179 Seven NC
counties and one city participate in this program,180 and another
eighteen counties have applied to participate.181 Those already
participating in the § 287(g) program have seen an increase in DWI
and license checkpoints.182 NC may be one of the first states with
almost statewide implementation at the local level of immigrant-
identification procedures.183
Other localities participate in the Secure Communities program
associated with ICE. These programs allow law enforcement to run
fingerprints through Department of Justice and Homeland Security
Immigration databases.184 In addition to partnerships with ICE, the
177. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
178. Deborah M. Weissman, Rebecca C. Headen & Katherine Lewis Parker, The Policies
and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287(g) Program in North Carolina 8
(Feb. 2009), http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf.
179. Edmond W. Caldwell Jr., The North Carolina Sheriffs’ Association’s Perspective on the
287(g) Jail Enforcement Model, 74 POPULAR GOV’T, Spring/Summer 2009, at 2, 2. For an in-
depth discussion of the agreements between local agencies and ICE, see Weissman, Headen
& Parker, supra note 178, at 22-26.
180. Immigration Customs Enforcement 287(g) Agreements with Local Sheriffs, ACLU
OF NORTH CAROLINA, http://web.archive.org/web/2013022790647/http://acluofnc.org/?q=due-
process (accessed through the Internet Archive Index).
181. Fast Facts: 287(g) Program, MECKLENBURG COUNTY SHERRIFF’S OFFICE, http://web.
archive.org/web/20120731144548/http://charmeck.org/mecklenburg/county/MCSO/Pages/28
7facts.aspx (accessed through the Internet Archive Index). Of consequence is the fact that a
separate, additional bond is issued to individuals detained under § 287(g).
182.  See Immigration Customs, supra note 180. The North Carolina ACLU attributes the
increase in checkpoints to attempts to catch more undocumented immigrants. 
183. Hannah Gill et al., Legal and Social Perspectives on Local Enforcement of Immigration
Under the 287(g) Program, 74 POPULAR GOV’T, Spring/Summer 2009, at 2, 5; see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 148-64.1(a) (2013).
184. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIG. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
secure_communities (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
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NC General Assembly passed legislation that requires jail adminis-
trators to attempt citizenship status determination when the
offender is charged with a felony or an impaired driving offense and
confined for any period of time.185 After conviction and sentencing,
NC is one of only a few states to grant the Parole Commission
discretionary authority to release an inmate convicted of DWI early
and into ICE custody for immediate deportation.186 In sum, less
severe sentence types and lengths may derive from immigration
enforcement rather than judicial correction. Only through the
extensive examination of hard copy case files will we have a firmer
grasp on how many Hispanic defendants do or expect to confront
citizenship-related questions.
Thinking more broadly about the issues addressed in this
Article, we recognize that research on differentials in criminal
justice outcomes has been conducted on essentially two levels. The
first describes differences among groups at a single decision point
over time. Because we presume up to some limit that equality is
“good” and that, above some threshold, inequality is “bad,” it is
perhaps more illustrative to think about how these perceptions
differ in a longer-run, dynamic analysis. It is much easier to
translate negative findings on the basis of income differentials into
pathways for advancement; changing one’s skin color, altering one’s
gender, tweaking one’s accent, or relocating one’s birthplace are
obviously much taller orders. Following this reasoning, empirical
evidence on disparate outcomes and intertemporal differentials
should be of policy interest. Because the observational period in our
study is eleven years, we have accounted for changing patterns over
time to rule out confounding effects from varying risk levels,
enforcement policies, and demographic shifts.
Recognizing limitations to our approach, we do not expect these
findings to automatically generalize to other crimes, time periods,
or states. In fact, although some results probably do contain more
widely applicable information, namely with respect to bond class
assignment and lower rates of private defense counsel use by blacks
and Hispanics, we expect other findings, such as the corrective
185. § 162-62(a); see also Weissman, Headen & Parker, supra note 178.
186. James M. Markham, Other Responsibilities of Sheriff’s Offices in Relation to the State’s
Foreign-Born Population, 74 POPULAR GOV’T, Spring/Summer 2009, at 15, 15.
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nature of prosecutorial and judicial discretion, to be more context-
specific. Deriving a uniform set of principles underlying observed
differences by race and gender is important work, but it is more
important for individual jurisdictions to monitor outcomes regularly
and systematically before evaluating justifications for specific policy
interventions.187 The increasing willingness of states to keep their
criminal data in digital formats facilitates this agenda. Because
records tend to be available only in hard copy, it is not surprising
that quantitative evaluations of the type we conducted are few and
far between, based on much more localized and smaller samples
than ours, and typically for select stages within the case disposition
process.188 More recent studies have exploited electronic arrest
records but generally only for parts of the resolution process.189
Second, one ideally would explore truly causal mechanisms
underlying any observed differences. The goal would be to attribute
our regression estimates to such factors as: (1) the unobserved
severity of underlying offenses; (2) unobserved indicators of
recidivism that may also affect the magistrate’s decision when bail
187. But see Chris S. Dula et al., Policing the Drunk Driver: Measuring Law Enforcement
Involvement in Reducing Alcohol-Impaired Driving, 38 J. SAFETY RES. 267, 267-68 (2007)
(using DUI arrest data in Tennessee to recommend policies for reducing recidivism). 
188. See, e.g., Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion:
Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733, 750-60
(2001) (using data from Maryland); Kris Henning & Lynette Feder, Criminal Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Offenses: An Investigation of Factors Predictive of Court Outcomes, 32 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 612, 633-34 (2005) (using data on 4178 domestic violence cases from one
domestic violence court to examine bail setting, prosecution outcomes, and disposition at
trial); Janell Schmidt & Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Charges
in Domestic Violence Cases, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 487, 490-99 (1989) (studying domestic violence
screening decisions among thirty-eight prosecutors employed in the office of the Milwaukee
County District Attorney). 
189. See, e.g., Laura Braslow & Ross E. Cheit, Judicial Discretion and (Un)equal Access:
A Systematic Study of Motions to Reduce Criminal Sentences in Rhode Island Superior Court
(1998-2003), 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 24, 33 (2011); see also Max Schanzenbach & Michael
L. Yaeger, Prison Time, Fines, and Federal White-Collar Criminals: The Anatomy of a Racial
Disparity, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 772-73 (2006); Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen
Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who Is Punished More
Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705, 707 tbl.1 (2000) (documenting the parameters of other
relevant studies on sentencing disparities); Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion
and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 427,
436 (2007) (analyzing sentencing outcomes using Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
data); Xia Wang & Daniel P. Mears, Examining the Direct and Interactive Effects of Changes
in Racial and Ethnic Threat on Sentencing Decisions, 47 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 522,
524 (2010) (using U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics State Court Processing data). 
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is set or the judge’s decision at sentencing; and (3) indigence,
measured roughly by median household income in the block group,
which at a minimum affects access to court-appointed counsel or
public defenders and the amount of cost-sharing available to the
recipients of legal services. Any residual after controlling for these
factors could plausibly track taste-based discrimination. For ex-
ample, one reason we found for the different prison incarceration
rates of black and white men is that black men charged with DWIs
were more likely to be convicted of a serious offense than white men
were. But we cannot extend such conclusions too far, certainly not
into the realm of identifying discriminatory behavior, because our
data do not capture enough of the relevant decision inputs.
Even if these alternative causal mechanisms are conceptually
distinct, rank-ordering in terms of their likelihood presents an
empirical challenge. Relationships between race and, say, income
are complex. For example, to what extent do black-white differences
in income reflect historic taste-based discrimination?190 Are illegal
aliens placed at a disadvantage in the job market because of their
immigration status? Magistrates and judges may be viewed as
Bayesian updaters.191 On this account, judicial officials maintain
priors with regard to guilt and offense severity. As they gain
experience with various types of cases, they update their beliefs in
light of previously convicted defendants’ post-release behavior and
the evidence presented in new cases, which in part is a function of
the quality of legal representation. Representation in turn reflects
income. Even though black men arrested for DWI tend to be con-
victed on more serious charges, could this reflect the quality of legal
counsel rather than actual differences in the offenses committed?
Higher arrest rates for a particular group may reflect statistical
discrimination that leads to greater rates of patrolling in majority-
Hispanic neighborhoods. Given how convoluted these causal
190. This question is analogous to the identification of so-called premarket factors in the
analysis of labor market discrimination. See generally Pedro Carneiro et al., Labor Market
Discrimination and Racial Differences in Premarket Factors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2005); Kerwin
Kofi Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Studying Discrimination: Fundamental Challenges and
Recent Progress, 3 ANN. REV. ECON. 479 (2011); Derek A. Neal & William R. Johnson, The Role
of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage Differences, 104 J. POL. ECON. 869 (1996).
191. For a primer on Bayesian statistics, see Jennifer S. Shoemaker et al., Bayesian
Statistics in Genetics: A Guide for the Uninitiated, 15 TRENDS GENETICS 354 (1999).
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pathways remain without supplementary data, it may be sufficient
to document how prosecutors offer a “second opinion” as to the
strength of evidence and guilt. This cross-checking, although costly,
is socially desirable because it helps us understand the ways in
which disparities, regardless of their origins, are narrowed by the
state’s due diligence.
Finally, we note several potential sources of endogeneity that
could affect our empirical analysis. The first follows from time-
invariant, omitted heterogeneity of arrestees. In other words, people
differ in ways that are not captured by the data. This heterogeneity
lies in either the nuances of their criminal and personal histories,
which are legitimate considerations for judicial actors, or other
traits, such as physical appearance, which tend to be illegitimate
considerations. Because some individuals have repeat arrest
observations in ACIS, one solution would be including individual-
level fixed effects. Because the focus of this study is on race and
gender differences, however, using these fixed effects, which remove
the impact of race and gender, would amount to throwing the baby
out with the bathwater. It is for this reason that we did not use race
or ethnicity in developing individual identifiers for our analysis of
ACIS data.
A second source of endogeneity is time-varying, omitted
individual arrestee heterogeneity. In this context, the relevant
missing data are changes in characteristics of the charge or of the
offenders themselves as opposed to their levels alone. A clever
approach for identifying the effects of race and ethnicity on case
disposition might be to exploit changes in race and ethnicity
identifiers for the same individual in the data.192 Then, in principle,
we could observe whether the case was resolved differently when
the arrestee was identified, say, as a black versus a white male. A
deficiency of this seemingly innovative approach is that the changes
in race identification are for persons whose appearance approaches
192. Cf. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Miscon-
ceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 817 (2010) (“To think of ‘partisan
effects’ causally, we must be able, at least in principle, to imagine an experiment that
manipulates partisanship. While we might manipulate the language of a brief, the drafting
of a statute, or the content of a legislative record, the manipulation of ‘ideology’ stretches
plausibility. How could we possibly manipulate a partisan belief system, let alone compare
this effect with the impact of law or philosophy?”) (footnote omitted).
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the margin of two or more race groups, for example, light-skinned
blacks or Hispanics with unaccented English.
Finally, endogeneity may arise because the dependent and
explanatory variables are jointly determined. For example, an
arrestee may make a deliberate choice to eschew legal counsel,
thereby saving litigation costs, and bear the adverse consequences
of conviction or a higher sentence. If so, the parameter estimate on
the covariate for pro se representation will be biased and inconsis-
tent. The standard solution is use of instrumental variables
techniques. A plausible instrumental variable might be the fraction
of DWI cases per year in the arrestee’s judicial district for which
defendants appear pro se. This approach relies upon the assumption
that some underlying, district-specific variation exists in judicial
decision-making that is observable to the parties, such as a
courtroom atmosphere in which defendants without counsel are
treated with respect, but unrelated to unobserved characteristics of
the offense or offender. This source of endogeneity is worth explor-
ing further in future research.
CONCLUSION
Identifying incongruous judicial outcomes by race and gender
surprises very few legal scholars and economists. Even though
empirical analysis may not always pinpoint with desired accuracy
what causal pathways create those disparities, that they exist
remains a stylized fact capable of multiple interpretations. In this
Article, we expanded the social scientific understanding of criminal
case processing by tracing differentials through major decision
points for the defendant, prosecutor, and judge. Differences between
blacks and Hispanics on one hand, and whites on the other, tend to
follow predicted patterns at each stage. What our findings suggest,
though, is that these gaps can taper as: (1) cases are disposed of
through non-trial processes; and (2) judicial officers exercise their
discretion in ways that counter earlier adverse outcomes. We do not
offer a complete narrative for why each disparity emerges or
diminishes. Additional methods and supplementary data are
necessary to better identify the causal mechanisms, and we have
reviewed some of the more promising approaches and techniques.
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Necessary and supplementary data that include information on
individual arrests are available only in hard copy, such as condi-
tions of pleas at the time plea bargains were reached. In the end,
paying attention to multiple outcomes within a single case will help
the legal community reduce impermissible differences in judicial
outcomes. Moreover, it will burnish the idea that early, adverse
determinations can be revised so as to make the U.S. criminal
justice system more equitable.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURE 1: SUMMARY OF CASE DISPOSITIONS ACROSS ALL DEFENDANTS
Source: ACIS.
Note: Where two percentages appear, the first represents the share of the
immediately preceding category, and the second denotes the share of all defendants
in the data. Otherwise, the percentage is only with respect to the immediately
preceding category.
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FIGURE 2: MEAN POPULATION SHARES BY RACE (2001-2011)
Sources: Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and
Hispanic Origin for States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/state/ST-EST00INT-03.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2014); State Characteristics: Vintage 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/2011/index.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2014); and ACIS.
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TABLE 1: HIGHEST FREQUENCY CRIMES BY SEVERITY LEVEL
Crime Category Crime Charged in Conjunction with DWI Frequency
Felony 1
Flee/Elude Arrest with Motor Vehicle 369
Felony Possession of Cocaine 172
Felony Hit and Run/Fail to Stop/Person Injured 106
Felony 2 Felony Serious Injury by Vehicle 48
Felony 3 Second Degree Murder 49Habitual Felony 34
Misdemeanor 1
Unsealed Wine/Liquor in Passenger Area 2362
Drinking Beer/Wine While Driving 1673
Resisting Public Officer 1536
Marijuana Possession up to 1/2 ounce 1495
Misdemeanor 2 Possession of Drug Paraphernalia 1042Misdemeanor Child Abuse 291
Traffic 1
No Operator’s License 32,141
Reckless Driving to Endanger 22,495
Speeding 18,067
Under 21 and Driving After Consuming Alcohol 12,258
Traffic 2
Driving While License Revoked 15,465
Operating Vehicle Without Insurance 2839
Hit and Run/Leave Scene/Property Damage 2609
Infraction
Driving Left of Center 22,648
Speeding 11,028
Failure to Wear Seatbelt (Driver) 6747
Failure to Stop at Stop Sign 4832
Source: ACIS.
Notes: Felonies and misdemeanor categories increase in severity with Class 1
including the least severe offenses. Traffic violations reflect a label created by the
AOC containing misdemeanor traffic offenses. Traffic 1 and 2 are equivalent to
Misdemeanor 1 and 2 in terms of sentencing classes and sentence length.
Infractions are non-criminal offenses that do not carry jail time.
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TABLE 2: NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF DRIVING FATALITIES  
(2001-2010)
Race/Gender 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2010 Total
 White 188(65.5%)
198
(68.8%)
208
(71.2%)
269
(67.6%)
135
(68.9%)
202
(73.2%)
1200
(69.1%)
Male 156(54.4%)
164
(56.9%)
177
(60.6%)
225
(56.5%)
117
(59.7%)
170
(61.6%)
1009
(58.1%)
Female 32(11.1%)
34
(11.8%)
31
(10.6%)
44
(11.1%)
18
(9.2%)
32
(11.6%)
191
(11.0%)
 Black 70(24.4%)
51
(17.7%)
50
(17.1%)
89
(22.4%)
49
(25.0%)
50
(18.1%)
359
(20.7%)
Male 64(22.3%)
44
(15.3%)
39
(13.4%)
83
(20.9%)
41
(20.9%)
41
(14.9%)
312
(18.0%)
Female 6 (2.1%)
7
(2.4%)
11
(3.8%)
6
(1.5%)
8
(4.1%)
9
(3.3%)
47
(2.7%)
 Hispanic 29(10.1%)
39
(13.5%)
34
(11.6%)
40
(10.1%)
12
(6.1%)
24
(8.7%)
178
(10.2%)
Male 29(10.1%)
38
(13.2%)
33
(11.3%)
39
(9.8%)
10
(5.1%)
22
(8.0%)
171
(9.8%)
Female 0(0%)
1
(0.3%)
1
(0.3%)
1
(0.3%)
2
(1.0%)
2
(0.7%)
7
(0.4%)
 Total 287 288 292 398 196 276 1737
Source: FARS.
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TABLE 3: MEAN VALUES OF SELECT VARIABLES FOR NON-FELONY
OFFENSES
All WhiteMale
Black
Male
Hispanic
Male
White
Female
Black
Female
Promise to appear
 (N = 381,150) 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.18 0.41 0.38
Unsecured bond 
(N = 381,150) 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.24 0.23
Cash 
(N = 381,150) 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.04 0.02
Secured bond 
(N = 381,150) 0.40 0.37 0.49 0.46 0.31 0.36
Prosecutor declined 
(N = 517,629) 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.30 0.16 0.14
Not guilty plea 
(N = 517,629) 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.11
Conviction | not guilty plea 
(N = 517,629) 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.66 0.62
Prior DWI conviction 
(N = 517,629) 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11
Private defense counsel 
(N = 473,615) 0.60 0.66 0.51 0.53 0.64 0.53
Pro se 
(N = 473,615) 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.14 0.16
Court-appointed attorney 
(N = 473,615) 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.19
Public defender 
(N = 473,615) 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.12
Any fine 
(N = 517,629) 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.61 0.56
Fine amount 
(N = 284,629) $205.61 $215.58 $213.22 $201.65 $185.98 $176.58
Any jail 
(N = 517,629) 0.60 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.61
Any prison 
(N = 517,629) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01
Sentence length 
(N = 321,315) 152.97 160.90 173.49 140.62 128.73 129.86
Any supervised probation 
(N = 517,629) 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.16 0.19
Supervised probation length 
(N = 517,629) 103.16 107.32 120.42 80.59 100.02 105.4
Median household income
($100,000s) (N = 423,894) 0.41 0.43 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.39
Expensive home index 
(N = 423,894) 0.28 0.32 0.23 0.22 0.33 0.26
Share with under 12 years
schooling (N = 423,894) 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.20
Source: ACIS.
Notes: All means, except those in bold, are significantly different from the means
for white males at the 5 percent level. Median household income is expressed in
$100,000 increments; thus, 0.41 represents $41,000.
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TABLE 4: THE PROBABILITY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE CONDITIONS
Bail/Bond Class Monetary Amount(1/0)
Monetary Amount
($)
(1) (2) (3)
Black Male 1.47[1.41, 1.46]
1.19
[1.17, 1.21]
330.36***
(124.24)
Hispanic Male 1.86[1.83, 1.89]
1.83
[1.81, 1.87]
147.09
(124.84)
White Female 0.77[0.76, 0.79]
0.85
[0.84, 0.87]
-74.22
(151.93)
Bail/Bond Category 1 215.75(296.13)
Bail/Bond Category 2 676.79**(310.40)
Bail/Bond Category 3 821.28***(283.36)
Felony DWI 5.25[4.63, 5.95]
1.71
[1.58, 1.84]
8075.96***
(498.72)
Prior DWI 1.30[1.26, 1.34]
1.11
[1.08, 1.15]
237.86
(221.55)
Median HH Income
($100,000s) 
0.41
[0.39, 0.44]
0.41
[0.39, 0.43]
777.42*
(439.16)
Expensive Home Index 1.02[1.01, 1.03]
1.02
[1.02, 1.03]
-22.25
(37.07)
Share with under 12
years schooling
0.72
[0.68, 0.77]
0.85
[0.80, 0.90]
1926.20***
(491.68)
County Fixed Effects? N N Y
N 382,870 517,629 268,577
Source: ACIS.
Notes: The regressions in Columns 1 and 2 use the ordered logit and logit
estimators, respectively, with odds ratios reported above 95 percent confidence
intervals in brackets. The ordering in Column 1 from numerical value 0 to 3 is:
promise to appear/custodial release/pretrial release; unsecured bond; cash; and
secured bond. Column 3 employs an OLS estimator, conditional on non-zero values,
with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the value in
nominal dollars. Odds ratios significant at the 5 percent level are highlighted in
bold. OLS coefficient estimate significance is denoted as follows: * = p < 0.10; ** =
p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01.
Other explanatory variables that are included in the regressions but not shown are:
black female, Hispanic female, “other” race male, “other” race female, an indicator
for a missing prior DWI value, and an indicator for no match with the Geolytics
data.
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TABLE 5: THE PROBABILITY OF PUBLICLY PROVIDED COUNSEL OR PRO
SE REPRESENTATION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black Male 1.92[1.89, 1.95]
1.92
[1.89, 1.95]
1.83
[1.80, 1.86]
1.72
[1.69. 1.74]
Hispanic Male 1.78[1.75, 1.81]
1.79
[1.76, 1.82]
1.70
[1.67, 1.73]
1.60
[1.58, 1.63]
White Female 1.11[1.08, 1.13]
1.11
[1.09, 1.13]
1.15
[1.13, 1.17]
1.18
[1.15, 1.20]
Felony DWI 3.68[3.39, 3.99]
3.15
[2.90, 3.43]
2.70
[2.48, 2.93]
Prior DWI 1.27[1.23, 1.31]
Median HH Income
($100,000s)
0.68
[0.65, 0.72]
Expensive Home Index 1.01[1.00, 1.01]
Share with under 12
years schooling
1.86
[1.75, 1.99]
Bail/Bond Category? N N Y Y
Concurrent Violations? N N N Y
N 473,615 473,615 473,615 473,615
Source: ACIS.
Notes: All estimates use the ordered logit and logit estimators, respectively, with
odds ratios reported above 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets, and
estimates significant at the 5 percent level are highlighted in bold. For variables
that are included in the regressions but not shown, see the note to Table 3.
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TABLE 6: THE PROBABILITY OF PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black Male 1.04[1.02, 1.06]
1.01
[0.99, 1.03]
1.04
[1.02, 1.06]
1.01
[0.99, 1.03]
1.00
[0.97, 1.02]
Hispanic Male 1.86[1.83, 1.90]
1.62
[1.59, 1.66]
1.61
[1.58, 1.64]
1.58
[1.55, 1.61]
White Female 0.91[0.89, 0.93]
0.92
[0.89, 0.94]
0.91
[0.89, 0.93]
0.92
[0.89, 0.94]
0.93
[0.90, 0.95]
Not Guilty Plea 0.20[0.19, 0.21]
0.24
[0.23, 0.25]
0.20
[0.19, 0.21]
0.24
[0.23, 0.25]
0.24
[0.23, 0.25]
Felony DWI 0.96[0.87, 1.05]
0.98
[0.89, 1.08]
0.94
[0.85, 1.04]
Prior DWI 0.84[0.81, 0.88]
Pro Se 0.83[0.82, 0.85]
0.84
[0.82, 0.86]
0.82
[0.80, 0.84]
Court-Appointed
Attorney
1.12
[1.09, 1.15]
1.12
[1.10, 1.15]
1.12
[1.09, 1.14]
Public Defender 1.25[1.21, 1.28]
1.25
[1.21, 1.28]
1.21
[1.17, 1.24]
Bail/Bond 
Category 1
1.21
[1.18, 1.24]
1.06
[1.03, 1.09]
1.08
[1.05, 1.10]
Bail/Bond 
Category 2
1.16
[1.13, 1.20]
1.04
[1.00, 1.07]
1.04
[1.00, 1.07]
Bail/Bond 
Category 3
1.01
[0.99, 1.03]
0.98
[0.96, 1.01]
0.98
[0.96, 1.00]
Median HH
Income ($100,000s) 
1.04
[0.97, 1.12]
Expensive Home
Index
1.00
[1.00, 1.01]
Share with under
12 years schooling 
1.24
[1.15, 1.35]
Concurrent
Violations? N N N N Y
N 517,629 517,629 517,629 517,629 517,629
Source: ACIS.
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions takes the value “1” if the
prosecutor declined the case and “0” otherwise. All estimates are odds ratios based
on a logit regression. Estimates are reported with 95 percent confidence intervals
in brackets, and estimates significant at the 5 percent level are highlighted in bold.
For variables that are included in the regressions but not shown, see the note to
Table 3.
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TABLE 7: THE PROBABILITY OF PLEADING NOT GUILTY
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black Male 0.82[0.80, 0.84]
0.91
[0.88, 0.93]
0.93
[0.90, 0.95]
0.95
[0.92, 0.97]
Hispanic Male 0.41[0.40, 0.43]
0.45
[0.43, 0.46]
0.46
[0.44, 0.47]
0.49
[0.47, 0.50]
White Female 1.01[0.98, 1.04]
1.01
[0.98, 1.04]
0.99
[0.97, 1.02]
0.97
[0.94, 0.99]
Felony DWI 0.33[0.27, 0.41]
0.33
[0.27, 0.41]
Prior DWI 0.88[0.83, 0.92]
Pro Se 0.43[0.41, 0.44]
0.44
[0.43, 0.46]
0.44
[0.43, 0.45]
Court-Appointed
Attorney
0.66
[0.64, 0.68]
0.70
[0.68, 0.72]
0.73
[0.71, 0.75]
Public Defender 0.52[0.49, 0.54]
0.54
[0.52, 0.57]
0.54
[0.52, 0.56]
Bail/Bond Category 1 0.91[0.88, 0.94]
0.91
[0.88, 0.93]
Bail/Bond Category 2 0.81[0.78, 0.85]
0.82
[0.78, 0.86]
Bail/Bond Category 3 0.71[0.70, 0.73]
0.72
[0.70, 0.73]
Median HH Income
($100,000s) 
0.69
[0.63, 0.75]
Expensive Home Index 0.69[0.63, 0.75]
Share with under 12
years schooling
0.24
[0.22, 0.27]
Concurrent Violations? N N N Y
N 418,312 418,312 418,312 418,312
Source: ACIS.
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions takes the value “1” if the
defendant decided to plead not guilty and “0” otherwise. All estimates are odds
ratios based on a logit regression. Estimates are reported with 95 percent
confidence intervals in brackets, and estimates significant at the 5 percent level are
highlighted in bold. For variables that are included in the regressions but not
shown, see the note to Table 3.
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TABLE 8: THE PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION CONDITIONAL ON A NOT
GUILTY PLEA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black Male 0.97[0.93, 1.02]
0.95
[0.90, 1.00]
0.97
[0.92, 1.02]
0.95
[0.90, 1.00]
Hispanic Male 1.25[1.16, 1.34]
1.21
[1.13, 1.30]
1.17
[1.09, 1.26]
1.10
[1.02, 1.18]
White Female 1.01[0.96, 1.06]
1.00
[0.94, 1.05]
0.99
[0.93, 1.04]
1.01
[0.84, 1.22]
Felony DWI 4.77[2.53, 9.01]
4.85
[2.55, 9.20]
Prior DWI 1.26[1.15, 1.29]
Pro Se 1.08[1.02, 1.15]
1.06
[0.99, 1.12]
1.15
[1.08, 1.22]
Court-Appointed
Attorney
1.70
[1.60, 1.81]
1.77
[1.66, 1.88]
1.73
[1.62, 1.84]
Public Defender 1.10[1.01, 1.19]
1.14
[1.05, 1.24]
1.22
[1.12, 1.32]
Bail/Bond Category 1 0.58[0.55, 0.61]
0.55
[0.52, 0.58]
Bail/Bond Category 2 1.02[0.93, 1.12]
1.00
[0.91, 1.10]
Bail/Bond Category 3 0.73[0.69, 0.76]
0.72
[0.68, 0.76]
Median HH Income
($100,000s) 
0.82
[0.70, 0.97]
Expensive Home Index 0.97[0.95, 0.98]
Share with under 12
years schooling
1.39
[1.13, 1.70]
Concurrent Violations? N N N Y
N 51,676 51,676 51,676 51,676
Source: ACIS.
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions takes the value “1” if the
defendant was convicted following a not guilty plea and “0” otherwise. All estimates
are odds ratios based on a logit regression. Estimates are reported with 95 percent
confidence intervals in brackets, and estimates significant at the 5 percent level are
highlighted in bold. For variables that are included in the regressions but not
shown, see the note to Table 3.
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TABLE 9: THE PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING MORE SEVERE SENTENCES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black Male 1.47[1.44, 1.50]
1.34
[1.31, 1.36]
1.27
[1.24 1.29]
1.15
[1.13, 1.17]
Hispanic Male 1.01[1.00, 1.03]
0.94
[0.92, 0.96]
0.85
[0.84, 0.87]
0.87
[0.85, 0.89]
White Female 0.62[0.61, 0.64]
0.60
[0.58, 0.61]
0.63
[0.61, 0.64]
0.61
[0.60, 0.63]
Not Guilty Plea 0.83[0.82, 0.85]
0.89
[0.87, 0.91]
0.94
[0.92, 0.97]
0.91
[0.89, 0.93]
Prior DWI 15.75[15.14, 16.39]
Pro Se 1.31[1.29, 1.33]
1.23
[1.21, 1.26]
1.31
[1.28, 1.33]
Court-Appointed
Attorney
2.44
[2.39, 2.48]
2.09
[2.04, 2.13]
1.99
[1.95, 2.03]
Public Defender 2.19[2.14, 2.24]
1.93
[1.88, 1.98]
1.93
[1.88, 1.98]
Bail/Bond Category 1 0.99[0.96, 1.01]
0.98
[0.96, 1.00]
Bail/Bond Category 2 1.45[1.41, 1.50]
1.41
[1.36, 1.46]
Bail/Bond Category 3 2.23[2.19, 2.27]
1.97
[1.94, 2.01]
Median HH Income
($100,000s)
0.72
[0.67, 0.77]
Expensive Home Index 0.99[0.99, 1.00]
Share with under 12
years schooling
2.99
[2.76, 3.23]
Concurrent Violations? N N N Y
N 307,116 307,116 307,116 307,116
Source: ACIS.
Notes: All estimates are odds ratios based on an ordered logit regression, where the
ordering of the dependent variable is as follows: non-felony Level 5 (1) to Level 1
(5) followed by felony convictions (6). Estimates are reported with 95 percent
confidence intervals in brackets, and estimates significant at the 5 percent level are
highlighted in bold. For variables that are included in the regressions but not
shown, see the note to Table 3.
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TABLE 10: FINES IMPOSED
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black Male 0.59[0.57, 0.60]
0.71
[0.69, 0.73]
0.75
[0.73, 0.77]
0.78
[0.76, 0.81]
Hispanic Male 0.68[0.66, 0.70]
0.77
[0.74, 0.79]
0.78
[0.76, 0.81]
0.75
[0.72, 0.77]
White Female 1.60[1.54, 1.67]
1.74
[1.67, 1.82]
1.68
[1.61, 1.76]
1.57
[1.50, 1.64]
Not Guilty Plea 0.89[0.86, 0.92]
0.75
[0.72, 0.78]
0.71
[0.68, 0.73]
0.67
[0.65, 0.70]
Felony DWI 0.01[0.01, 0.02]
Prior DWI 0.52[0.49, 0.55]
Pro Se 0.48[0.47, 0.50]
0.51
[0.49, 0.52]
0.47
[0.46, 0.49]
Court-Appointed
Attorney
0.19
[0.19, 0.20]
0.21
[0.21, 0.22]
0.24
[0.23, 0.25]
Public Defender 0.21[0.20, 0.22]
0.23
[0.22, 0.24]
0.24
[0.23, 0.25]
Bail/Bond Category 1 1.29[1.23, 1.35]
1.33
[1.27, 1.40]
Bail/Bond Category 2 1.75[1.63, 1.88]
1.88
[1.75, 2.03]
Bail/Bond Category 3 0.52[0.50, 0.53]
0.60
[0.58, 0.62]
Median HH Income
($100,000s) 
1.60
[1.42, 1.80]
Expensive Home Index 1.02[1.01, 1.03]
Share with under 12 years
schooling
0.57
[0.51, 0.65]
Concurrent Violations? N N N Y
N 323,115 323,115 323,115 323,115
Source: ACIS.
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions takes the value “1” if the
defendant received a fine as part of the sentence and “0” otherwise. All estimates
are odds ratios based on a logit regression. Estimates are reported with 95 percent
confidence intervals in brackets, and estimates significant at the 5 percent level are
highlighted in bold. For variables that are included in the regressions but not
shown, see the note to Table 3.
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TABLE 11: THE PROBABILITY OF BEING SENTENCED TO JAIL OR PRISON
Jail Prison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black Male 0.59[0.57, 0.62]
0.75
[0.72, 0.79]
0.782
[0.78, 0.86]
1.75
[1.67, 1.82]
1.21
[1.15, 1.27]
Hispanic Male 4.86[4.43, 5.32]
5.18
[4.72, 5.69]
5.95
[5.40, 6.55]
0.13
[0.11, 0.15]
0.10
[0.09, 0.11]
White Female 2.96[2.72, 3.23]
2.99
[2.74, 3.26]
2.76
[2.52, 3.01]
0.26
[0.23, 0.29]
0.27
[0.24, 0.30]
Not Guilty Plea 1.75[1.62, 1.88]
1.50
[1.39, 1.62]
1.43
[1.32, 1.55]
0.63
[0.59, 0.68]
0.82
[0.75, 0.89]
Felony DWI 0.06[0.05, 0.07]
18.16
[16.36, 20.17]
Prior DWI 0.38[0.34, 0.41]
0.45
[0.41, 0.49]
2.62
[2.38, 2.90]
Pro Se 0.52[0.49, 0.55]
0.49
[0.47, 0.52]
3.00
[2.80, 3.19]
Court-Appointed
Attorney
0.22
[0.21, 0.23]
0.24
[0.23, 0.26]
5.92
[5.60, 6.27]
Public Defender 0.38[0.36, 0.41]
0.41
[0.39, 0.44]
3.36
[3.12, 3.62]
Bail/Bond 
Category 1
0.79
[0.73, 0.86]
0.81
[0.74, 0.88]
1.19
[1.08, 1.31]
Bail/Bond 
Category 2
0.95
[0.83, 1.09]
0.96
[0.84, 1.10]
0.89
[0.75, 1.06]
Bail/Bond 
Category 3
0.46
[0.43, 0.49]
0.49
[0.46, 0.52]
2.19
[2.04, 2.35]
Median HH Income
($100,000s) 
3.19
[2.55, 3.98]
0.31
[0.24, 0.40]
Expensive Home
Index
1.01
[0.99, 1.03]
1.00
[0.98, 1.02]
Share with under
12 years schooling 
0.30
[0.24, 0.37]
3.79
[2.99, 4.80]
Concurrent
Violations? N Y Y N Y
N 323,115 323,115 323,115 323,115 323,115
Source: ACIS.
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 takes the value “1” if the defendant
was sentenced to jail and “0” otherwise; the dependent variables in Columns 4 and
5 are the same but for prison sentences. All estimates are odds ratios based on a
logit regression. Estimates are reported with 95 percent confidence intervals in
brackets, and estimates significant at the 5 percent level are highlighted in bold.
For variables that are included in the regressions but not shown, see the note to
Table 3.
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TABLE 12: SENTENCE LENGTHS BY INCARCERATION TYPE
Jail Prison
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black Male 19.04***(1.95)
4.18**
(1.94)
-32.08***
(5.53)
-24.00***
(5.26)
Hispanic Male -7.01***(1.95)
-11.19***
(1.99)
35.79
(14.70)
12.82
(13.69)
White Female -24.80***(2.14)
-22.50***
(2.08)
-21.35*
(12.48)
-13.58
(11.59)
Not Guilty Plea -6.30***(2.38)
-1.59
(2.32)
9.37
(9.63)
15.06*
(8.97)
Felony DWI 247.04***(12.13)
128.31***
(6.91)
Prior DWI 247.56***(3.68)
121.58***
(10.07)
Pro Se 9.37***(1.91)
3.89
(7.01)
Court-Appointed
Attorney
26.09***
(2.01)
11.09*
(5.75)
Public Defender 26.70***(2.63)
18.68**
(9.04)
Bail/Bond Category 1 9.56***(2.54)
21.06*
(11.02)
Bail/Bond Category 2 20.68***(3.15)
17.67
(18.39)
Bail/Bond Category 3 47.55***(2.02)
44.20***
(8.16)
Median HH Income
($100,000s)
-14.48**
(6.35)
-22.20
(28.53)
Expensive Home Index -0.19(0.56)
-0.30
(2.00)
Share with under 12
years schooling
11.67
(7.58)
2.64
(25.91)
Concurrent Violations? N Y N Y
N 311,277 311,277 9880 9880
Source: ACIS.
Notes: All estimates are derived from year and county fixed effects OLS regres-
sions. Coefficient significance is denoted as follows: * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; ***
= p < 0.01. For variables that are included in the regressions but not shown, see the
note to Table 3.
